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THE COMPLEXITY OF CONTRACTS∗1
P. DÜTTING† , T. ROUGHGARDEN‡ , AND I. TALGAM-COHEN§2
Abstract. We initiate the study of computing (near-)optimal contracts in succinctly repre-3
sentable principal-agent settings. Here optimality means maximizing the principal’s expected payoff4
over all incentive-compatible contracts—known in economics as “second-best” solutions. We also5
study a natural relaxation to approximately incentive-compatible contracts.6
We focus on principal-agent settings with succinctly described (and exponentially large) outcome7
spaces. We show that the computational complexity of computing a near-optimal contract depends8
fundamentally on the number of agent actions. For settings with a constant number of actions,9
we present a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for the separation oracle of the10
dual of the problem of minimizing the principal’s payment to the agent, and use this subroutine11
to efficiently compute a δ-incentive-compatible (δ-IC) contract whose expected payoff matches or12
surpasses that of the optimal IC contract.13
With an arbitrary number of actions, we prove that the problem is hard to approximate within14
any constant c. This inapproximability result holds even for δ-IC contracts where δ is a sufficiently15
rapidly-decaying function of c. On the positive side, we show that simple linear δ-IC contracts with16
constant δ are sufficient to achieve a constant-factor approximation of the “first-best” (full-welfare-17
extracting) solution, and that such a contract can be computed in polynomial time.18
Key words. Principal-agent problem, contract theory, moral hazard, computational complexity,19
hardness of approximation, FPTAS20
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1. Introduction. Economic theory distinguishes three fundamentally different22
problems involving asymmetric information and incentives. In the first—known as23
mechanism design (or screening)—the less informed party has to make a decision.24
A canonical example is Myerson’s optimal auction design problem [42], in which a25
seller wants to maximize the revenue from selling an item, having only incomplete26
information about the buyers’ willingness to pay. The second problem is known as27
signalling (or Bayesian persuasion). Here, as in the first case, information is hidden,28
but this time the more informed party is the active party. A canonical example is29
Akerlof’s “market for lemons” [1]. In this example, sellers are better informed about30
the quality of the products they sell, and may benefit by sharing (some) of their31
information with the buyers.32
Both of these basic incentive problems have been studied very successfully and33
extensively from a computational perspective, see, e.g., [9, 10, 11, 6, 12, 5, 28, 29] and34
[19, 21, 17, 22].35
The third basic problem, the agency problem in contract theory, has received36
far less attention from the theoretical computer science community, despite being37
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regarded as equally important in economic theory (see, e.g., the scientific background38
on the 2016 Nobel Prize for Hart and Holmström [48]). (A notable exception is [4],39
which we will discuss with further related work in more detail below.)40
The basic scenario of contract theory is captured by the following hidden-action41
principal-agent problem [30]: There is one principal and one agent. The agent can42
take one of n actions ai ∈ An. Each action ai is associated with a distribution Fi over43
m outcomes xj ∈ R≥0, and has a cost ci ∈ R≥0. The principal designs a contract p44
that specifies a payment p(xj) for each outcome xj . The agent chooses an action ai45
that maximizes expected payment minus cost, i.e.,
∑
j Fi,jp(xj) − ci. The principal46
seeks to set up the contract so that the chosen action maximizes expected outcome47
minus expected payment, i.e.,
∑
j Fi,jxj −
∑
j Fi,jp(xj).48
The principal-agent problem is quite different from mechanism design and sig-49
nalling, where the basic difficulty is the information asymmetry and that part of the50
information is hidden. In the principal-agent problem the issue is one of moral haz-51
ard : in and by itself the agent has no intrinsic interest in the expected outcome to52
the principal.53
It is straightforward to see that the optimal contract can be found in time polyno-54
mial in n and m by solving n linear programs (LPs). For each action the corresponding55
LP gives the smallest expected payment at which this action can be implemented. The56
action that yields the highest expected reward minus payment gives the optimal payoff57
to the principal, and the LP for this action the optimal contract.58
Succinct principal-agent problems. This linear programming-based algo-59
rithm for computing an optimal contract has several analogs in algorithmic game60
theory:61
1. Mechanism design. For many basic mechanism design problems, the optimal62
(randomized) mechanism is the solution of a linear program with size polynomial63
in that of the players’ joint type space.64
2. Signalling. For many computational problems in signalling, the optimal signalling65
scheme is the solution to a linear program with size polynomial in the number of66
receiver actions and possible states of nature.67
3. Correlated equilibria. In finite games, a correlated equilibrium can be computed68
using a linear program with size polynomial in the number of game outcomes.69
These linear-programming-based solutions are unsatisfactory when their size is ex-70
ponential in some parameter of interest. For example, in the mechanism design and71
correlated equilibria examples, the size of the LP is exponential in the number of play-72
ers. A major contribution of theoretical computer science to game theory and eco-73
nomics has been the articulation of natural classes of succinctly representable settings74
and a thorough study of the computational complexity of optimal design problems in75
such settings. Examples include work on multi-dimensional mechanism design that76
has emphasized succinct type distributions [9, 10, 11, 12], succinct signalling schemes77
with an exponential number of states of nature [22], and the efficient computation of78
correlated equilibria in succinctly representable multi-player games [46, 36]. The goal79
of this paper is to initiate an analogous line of work for succinctly described agency80
problems in contract theory.81
We focus on principal-agent settings with succinctly described (and exponentially82
large) outcome spaces, along with a reward function that supports value queries and83
a distribution for each action with polynomial description. While there are many84
such settings one can study, we focus on what is arguably the most natural one from85
a theoretical computer science perspective, where outcomes correspond to vertices86
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of the hypercube, the reward function is additive, and the distributions are product87
distributions. (Cf., work on computing revenue-maximizing multi-item auctions with88
product distributions over additive valutions, e.g. [9, 10].)89
For example, outcomes could correspond to sets of items, where items are sold90
separately using posted prices. Actions could correspond to different marketing strate-91
gies with different costs, which lead to different (independent) probabilities of sales92
of various items. Or, imagine that a firm (principal) uses a headhunter (agent) to93
hire an employee (action). Dimensions could correspond to tasks or skills. Actions94
correspond to types of employees, costs correspond to the difficulty of recruiting an95
employee of a given type, and for each employee type there is some likelihood that96
they will possess each skill (or be able to complete some task). The firm wants to97
motivate the headhunter to put in enough effort to recruit an employee who is likely98
to have useful skills for the firm, without actually running extensive interviews to find99
out the employee’s type.100
In our model, as in the classic model, there is a principal and an agent. The agent101
can take one of n actions ai ∈ An, and each action has a cost ci ∈ R≥0. Unlike in the102
original model, we are given a set of items M , with |M | = m. Outcomes correspond103
to subsets of items S ∈ 2M . Each item has a reward rj , and the reward of a set104
S of items is
∑
j∈S rj . Every action ai comes with probabilities qi,j for each item105
j. If action ai is chosen, each item j is included in the outcome independently with106
probability qi,j . A contract specifies a payment pS for each outcome S ∈ 2M . The107
goal is to compute a contract that maximizes (perhaps approximately) the principal’s108
payoff in running time polynomial in n and m (which is logarithmic in the size |2M |109
of the outcome space).110
A notion of approximate IC for contracts. The classic approach in contract111
theory is to require that the agent is incentivized exactly, i.e., he (weakly) prefers112
the chosen action over every other action. We refer to such contracts as incentive113
compatible or just IC contracts. Motivated in part by our hardness results for IC114
contracts (see the next section) and inspired by the success of notions of approximate115
incentive compatibility in mechanism design (as, for example, in [8, 51, 12], hereafter116
referred to as the CDW framework), we introduce a notion of approximate incentive117
compatibility that is suitable for contracts.118
Our notion of δ-incentive compatibility (or δ-IC) is that the agent utility of the119
approximately incentivized action ai is at least that of any other action ai′ , less δ.120
(See Section 2.4 for details, including how to turn δ-IC contracts into IC contracts121
with small multiplicative—and necessarily—additive loss.) This notion is natural122
for several reasons. First, it coincides with the usual notion of ε-IC in “normalized”123
mechanism design settings (with all valuations between 0 and 1), as in [8, 51]. A second124
reason is behaviorial. There is an increasing body of work in economics on behavioral125
biases in contract theory [39], including strong empirical evidence that such biases play126
an important role in practice—for example, that agents “gift” effort to the principals127
employing them [2]. The notion of δ-IC offers a mathematical formulation of an agent’s128
bias. Along similar lines, [15] advocates generally for approximate IC constraints in129
settings where the designer can propose their “preferred action” to agents, in which130
case an agent may be biased against deviating due to the complexities involved in131
determining the agent-optimal action or the psychological costs of deviating. See also132
[25] for related discussion in the context of contract theory.133
1.1. Our contribution and techniques. We prove several positive and nega-134
tive algorithmic results for computing near-optimal contracts in succinctly described135
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principal-agent settings. Our work reveals a fundamental dichotomy between settings136
with a constant number of actions and those with an arbitrary number of actions.137
Constant number of actions. For a constant number of actions, we prove in138
Section 3 that while it is NP -hard to compute an optimal IC contract, there is an139
FPTAS that computes a δ-IC contract with expected principal surplus at least that140
of the optimal IC contract; the running time is polynomial in m and 1/δ.141
Theorem 1.1 (See Theorem 3.1, Corollary 3.2). For every constant n ≥ 1 and142
δ > 0, there is an algorithm that computes a δ-IC contract with expected principal143
surplus at least that of an optimal IC contract in time polynomial in m and 1/δ.144
The starting point of our algorithm is a linear programming formulation of the145
problem of incentivizing a given action with the lowest possible expected payment.146
Our formulation has a polynomial number of constraints (one per action other than147
the to-be-incentivized one) but an exponential number of variables (one per outcome).148
A natural idea is to then solve the dual linear program using the ellipsiod method.149
The dual separation oracle is: given a weighted mixture of n−1 product distributions150
(over the m items) and a reference product distribution q∗, minimize the ratio of151
the probability of outcome S in the mixture distribution and that in the reference152
distribution. Unfortunately, as we show, this is an NP -hard problem, even when153
there are only n = 3 actions. On the other hand, we provide an FPTAS for the154
separation oracle in the case of a constant number of actions, based on a delicate multi-155
dimensional bucketing approach. The standard method of translating an FPTAS for156
a separation oracle to an FPTAS for the corresponding linear program relies on a157
scale-invariance property that is absent in our problem. We proceed instead via a158
strengthened version of our dual linear program, to which our FPTAS separation159
oracle still applies, and show how to extract from an approximately optimal dual160
solution a δ-IC contract with objective function value at least that of the optimal161
solution to the original linear program.162
Arbitrary number of actions. The restriction to a constant number of actions163
is essential for the positive results above (assuming P 6= NP ). Specifically, we prove164
in Section 4 that computing the IC contract that maximizes the expected payoff to the165
principal is NP -hard, even to approximate to within any constant c. This hardness166
of approximation result persists even if we relax from exact IC to δ-IC contracts,167
provided δ is sufficiently small as a function of c.168
Theorem 1.2 (See Theorem 4.1, Corollary 4.2). For every constant c ∈ R, c ≥ 1,169
it is NP -hard to find a IC contract that approximates the optimal expected payoff170
achievable by an IC contract to within a multiplicative factor of c.171
Theorem 1.3 (See Theorem 4.1, Corollary 4.3). For any constant c ∈ R, c ≥ 5172
and δ ≤ ( 14c )
c, it is NP -hard to find a δ-IC contract that guarantees > 2cOPT, where173
OPT is the optimal expected payoff achievable by an IC contract.174
We prove these hardness of approximation results by reduction from MAX-3SAT,175
using the fact that it is NP -hard to distinguish between a satisfiable MAX-3SAT176
instance and one in which there is no assignment satisfying more than a 7/8+α fraction177
of the clauses, where α is some arbitrarily small constant [33]. Our reduction utilizes178
the gap between “first best” (full-welfare-extracting) and “second best” solutions in179
contract design settings, where satisfiable instances of MAX-3SAT map to instances180
where there is no gap between first and second best and instances of MAX-3SAT in181
which no more than 7/8 + α clauses can be satisfied map to instances where there is182
a constant-factor multiplicative gap between the first-best and second-best solutions.183
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On the positive side, we prove that for every constant δ there is a simple (in184
fact, linear1) contract that achieves a cδ-approximation, where cδ is a constant that185
depends on δ. This approximation guarantee is with respect to the strongest possible186
benchmark, the first-best solution.2187
Theorem 1.4 (See Theorem 5.1). For every constant δ > 0 there exists a con-188
stant cδ and a polynomial-time (in n and m) computable δ-IC contract that obtains a189
multiplicative cδ-approximation to the optimal welfare.190
Our proof of this result, in Section 5, shows that the optimal social welfare can191
be upper bounded by a sum of (constantly many in δ) expected payoffs achievable by192
δ-IC contracts. The best such contract thus obtains a constant approximation to the193
optimal welfare.194
Black-box distributions. Product distributions are a rich and natural class195
of succinctly representable distributions to study, but one could also consider other196
classes. Perhaps the strongest-imaginable positive result would be an efficient algo-197
rithm for computing a near-optimal contract that works with no assumptions about198
each action’s probability distribution over outcomes, other than the ability to sample199
from them efficiently. (Positive examples of this sort in signalling include [22] and in200
mechanism design include [32] and its many follow-ups.) Interestingly, the principal-201
agent problem poses unique challenges to such “black-box” positive results. The moral202
reason for this is explained, for example, in [49]: Rewards play a dual role in contract203
settings, both defining the surplus from the joint project to be shared between the204
principal and agent and providing a signal to the principal of the agent’s action. For205
this reason, in optimal contracts, the payment to the agent in a given outcome is206
governed both by the outcome’s reward and on its “informativeness,” and the latter207
is highly sensitive to the precise probabilities in the outcome distributions associated208
with each action. In Section 6 we translate this intuition into an information-theoretic209
impossibility result for the black-box model, showing that positive results are possible210
only under strong assumptions on the distributions (e.g., that the minimum non-zero211
probability is bounded away from 0).212
1.2. Related work. The study of computational aspects of contract theory was213
pioneered by Babaioff, Feldman and Nisan [4] (see also their subsequent works, notably214
[24] and [7]). This line of work studies a problem referred to as combinatorial agency,215
in which combinations of agents replace the single agent in the classic principal-agent216
model. The challenge in the new model stems from the need to incentivize multiple217
agents, while the action structure of each agent is kept simple (effort/no effort). The218
focus of this line of work is on complex combinations of agents’ efforts influencing219
the outcomes, and how these determine the subsets of agents to contract with. The220
resulting computational problems are very different from the computational problems221
in our model.3222
A second direction of highly related work is [3]. This work considers a principal-223
agent model in which the agent action space is exponentially sized but compactly224
1A linear contract is defined by a single parameter α ∈ [0, 1], and sets the payment pS for any
set S ∈ 2M to pS = α ·
∑
j∈S rj . Linear contracts correspond to a simple percentage commission,
and are arguably among the most frequently used contracts in practice. See [16] and [23] for recent
work in economics and computer science in support of linear contracts.
2Note that the principal’s objective function (reward minus payment to the agent) is a mixed-sign
objective; such functions are generally challenging for relative approximation results.
3For example, several of the key computational questions in their problem turn out to be #P -
hard, while all of the problems we consider are in NP .
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represented, and argue that in such settings indirect (interactive) mechanisms can225
be better than one-shot mechanisms. Our focus is more algorithmic, and instead of226
a compactly represented action space we consider a compactly represented outcome227
space.228
A third direction of related work considers a bandit-style model for contract design229
[34]. In their model each arm corresponds to a contract, and they present a procedure230
that starts out with a discretization of the contract space, which is adaptively refined,231
and which achieves sublinear regret in the time horizon. Again the result is quite232
different from our work, where the complexity comes from the compactly represented233
outcome space, and our result on the black-box model sheds a more negative light on234
the learning approach.235
Further related work comes from Kleinberg and Kleinberg [38] who consider the236
problem of delegating a task to an agent in a setting where (unlike in our model)237
monetary compensation is not an option. Although payments are not available, they238
show through an elegant reduction to the prophet-inequality problem that constant239
competitive solutions are possible.240
A final related line of work was initiated by Carroll [16] who—working in the clas-241
sic model (where computational complexity is not an issue)—shows a sense in which242
linear contracts are max-min optimal (see also the recent work of [50]). Dütting et243
al. [23] show an alternative such sense, and also provide tight approximation guaran-244
tees for linear contracts.245
2. Preliminaries. We start by defining succinct principal-agent settings and246
the contract design problem.247
2.1. Succinct principal-agent settings. Let n and m be parameters. A248
principal-agent setting is composed of the following: n actions An among which the249
agent can choose, and their costs 0 = c1 ≤ · · · ≤ cn for the agent; outcomes which the250
actions can lead to, and their rewards for the principal; and a mapping from actions251
to distributions over outcomes. Crucially, the agent’s choice of action is hidden from252
the principal, who observes only the action’s realized outcome. Our goal is to study253
succinct principal-agent settings with description size polynomial in n and m; the254
(implicit) outcome space can have size exponential in m. Throughout, unless stated255
otherwise, all principal-agent settings we consider are succinct. We focus on arguably256
one of the most natural models of succinctly-described settings, namely those with257
additive rewards and product distributions.258
In more detail, let M = {1, 2, ..,m}, where M is referred to as the item set. Let259
the outcome space be {0, 1}M , that is, every outcome is an item subset S ⊆ M . For260
every item j ∈ M , the principal gets an additive reward rj if the realized outcome261
includes j, so the principal’s reward for outcome S is rS =
∑
j∈S rj . Every action262
ai ∈ An is associated with probabilities qi,1, ..., qi,m ∈ [0, 1] for the items. We denote263
the corresponding product distribution by qi. When the agent takes action ai, item j is264
included in the realized outcome independently with probability qi,j . The probability265
of outcome S is thus qi,S = (
∏
j∈S qi,j)(
∏
j /∈S(1− qi,j)). By linearity of expectation,266
the principal’s expected reward given action ai is Ri =
∑
S qi,SrS =
∑
j qi,jrj . Action267
ai’s expected welfare is Ri − ci, and we assume Ri − ci ≥ 0 for every i ∈ [n].268
Example 2.1 (Succinct principal-agent setting). A company (principal) hires an269
agent to sell its m products. The agent may succeed in selling any subset of the m270
items, depending on his effort level, where the ith level leads to sale of item j with271
probability qi,j. Reward rj from selling item j is the profit-margin of product j for the272
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company.273
Representation. A succinct principal-agent setting is described by an n-vector274
of costs c, an m-vector of rewards r, and an n×m-matrix Q where entry (i, j) is equal275
to probability qi,j (and we assume for simplicity that the number of bits of precision276
for all values is poly(n,m)).277
Assumptions. Our assumption that c1 = 0 is a typical assumption in the con-278
tracts literature. It serves to make the individual rationality constraint a special case279
of the incentive compatibility constraint (also see Section 2.2 below).280
Unless stated otherwise, we assume that all principal-agent settings are normal-281
ized, i.e., Ri ≤ 1 for every ai ∈ An (and thus also ci ≤ 1). Normalization amounts to a282
simple change of “currency”, i.e., of the units in which rewards and costs are measured.283
It is a standard assumption in the context of approximate incentive compatibility—see284
Section 2.3 (similar assumptions appear in both the CDW framework and in [15]).285
2.2. Contracts and incentives. A contract p is a vector of payments from the286
principal to the agent. Payments are non-negative; this is known as limited liability of287
the agent.4 The contractual payments are contingent on the outcomes and not actions,288
as the actions are not directly observable by the principal. A contract p can potentially289
specify a payment pS ≥ 0 for every outcome S, but by linear programming (LP)290
considerations detailed below, we can focus on contracts for which the support size291
of the vector p is polynomial in n. We sometimes denote by pi the expected payment292 ∑
S⊆M qi,SpS to the agent for choosing action ai, and without loss of generality restrict293
attention to contracts for which pi ≤ Ri for every ai ∈ An (in particular, pi ≤ 1 by294
normalization).295
Given contract p, the agent’s expected utility from choosing action ai is pi − ci.296
The principal’s expected payoff is then Ri − pi. The agent wishes to maximize his297
expected utility over all actions and over an outside option with utility normalized to298
zero (“individual rationality” or IR). Since by assumption the cost c1 of action a1 is299
0, the outside opportunity is always dominated by action a1 and so we can omit the300
outside option from consideration. Therefore, the incentive constraints for the agent301
to choose action ai are: pi − ci ≥ pi′ − ci′ for every i′ 6= i. If these constraints hold302
we say ai is incentive compatible (IC) (and as discussed, in our model IC implies IR).303
The standard tie-breaking assumption in the contract design literature is that among304
several IC actions the agent tie-breaks in favor of the principal, i.e. chooses the IC305
action that maximizes the principal’s expected payoff.5 We say contract p implements306
or incentivizes action ai if given p the agent chooses ai (namely ai is IC and survives307
tie-breaking). If there exists such a contract for action ai we say ai is implementable,308
and slightly abusing notation we sometimes refer to the implementing contract as an309
IC contract.310
Simple contracts. In a linear contract, the payment scheme is a linear function311
of the rewards, i.e., pS = αrS for every outcome S. We refer to α ∈ [0, 1] as the312
linear contract’s parameter, and it serves as a succinct representation of the contract.313
Linear contracts have an alternative succinct representation by an m-vector of item314
payments pj = αrj for every j ∈ M , which induce additive payments pS =
∑
j∈S pj .315
A natural generalization is separable contracts, the payments of which can also be316
4Limited liability plays a similar role in the contract literature as risk-averseness of the agent.
Both reflect the typical situation in which the principal has “deeper pockets” than the agent and is
thus the better bearer of expenses/risks.
5The idea is that one could perturb the payment schedule slightly to make the desired action
uniquely optimal for the agent. For further discussion see [13, p. 8].
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separated over the m items and represented by an m-vector of non-negative payments317
(not necessarily linear). The optimal linear (resp., separable) contract can be found in318
polynomial time (see Proposition A.1 in Appendix A). We return to linear contracts319
in Section 5 and to separable contracts in Appendix H.320
2.3. Contract design and relaxations. The goal of contract design is to max-321
imize the principal’s expected payoff from the action chosen by the agent subject322
to IC constraints. A corresponding computational problem is OPT-CONTRACT:323
The input is a succinct principal-agent setting, and the output is the principal’s ex-324
pected payoff from the optimal IC contract. A related problem is MIN-PAYMENT:325
The input is a succinct principal-agent setting and an action ai, and the output is326
the minimum expected payment p∗i with which ai can be implemented (up to tie-327
breaking). OPT-CONTRACT reduces to solving n instances of MIN-PAYMENT to328
find p∗i for every action ai, and returning the maximum expected payoff to the prin-329
cipal maxi∈[n]{Ri − p∗i }. Observe that MIN-PAYMENT can be formulated as an330
exponentially-sized LP with 2m variables {pS} (one for each set S ⊆ M) and n − 1331
constraints:332
min
∑
S⊆M
qi,SpS(2.1)333
s.t.
∑
S⊆M
qi,SpS − ci ≥
∑
S⊆M
qi′,SpS − ci′ ∀i′ 6= i, i′ ∈ [n],334
pS ≥ 0 ∀S ⊆M.335336
While we can’t use this LP formulation to compute an optimal contract, it implies337
that there is a succinct optimal contract: There exists an extreme point of the feasible338
region which is optimal. That extreme point must satisfy 2m constraints with equality339
(one per variable). Only n− 1 of those constraints aren’t of the form pS = 0, so the340
remaining constraints must all have pS = 0.341
The dual LP has n− 1 nonnegative variables {λi′} (one for every action i′ other342
than i), and exponentially-many constraints:343
max
∑
i′ 6=i
λi′(ci − ci′)(2.2)
s.t.
(∑
i′ 6=i
λi′
)
− 1 ≤
∑
i′ 6=i
λi′
qi′,S
qi,S
∀S ⊆ E, qi,S > 0,
λi′ ≥ 0 ∀i′ 6= i, i′ ∈ [n].344345
However, the ellipsoid method cannot be applied to solve the dual LP in polyno-346
mial time. The separation oracle, which is related to the concept of likelihood ratios347
from statistical inference, turns out to be NP-hard except for the n = 2 case—see348
Proposition B.1 in Appendix B.349
We return to LP (2.1) and to its dual LP (2.2) in Section 3.350
Relaxed IC. Contract design like auction design is ultimately an optimization351
problem subject to IC constraints. The state-of-the-art in optimal auction design352
requires a relaxation of IC constraints to ε-IC. In the CDW framework, the ε loss353
factor is additive and applies to normalized auction settings. The framework enables354
polytime computation of an ε-IC auction with expected revenue approximating that355
of the optimal IC auction.6 Appropriate ε-IC relaxations are also studied in multiple356
6To be precise, the CDW framework focuses on Bayesian IC (BIC) and ε-BIC auctions.
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additional contexts—see [15] and references within for voting, matching and compet-357
itive equilibrium; and [45] for Nash equilibrium. We wish to achieve similar results in358
the context of optimal contracts. For completeness we include the definition of ε-IC359
cast in the language of contracts:360
Definition 2.2 (δ-IC action). Consider a (normalized) contract setting. For δ ≥361
0, an action ai is δ-IC given a contract p if the agent loses no more than additive δ362
in expected utility by choosing ai, i.e.: pi− ci ≥ pi′ − ci′ − δ for every action ai′ 6= ai.363
As in the IC case, we often slightly abuse notation and refer to the contract p itself364
as δ-IC. By this we mean a contract p with an (implicit) action ai that is δ-IC given p (if365
there are several such δ-IC actions, by our tie-breaking assumption the agent chooses366
the one that maximizes the principal’s expected payoff). We also say the contract367
δ-implements or δ-incentivizes action ai. Finally if there exists such a contract for368
ai then we say this action is δ-implementable. We denote by δ-OPT-CONTRACT369
and δ-MIN-PAYMENT the above computational problems with IC replaced by δ-IC370
(e.g., the input to δ-OPT-CONTRACT is a succinct principal-agent setting and a371
parameter δ, and the output is the principal’s expected payoff from the optimal δ-IC372
contract).373
2.4. Properties of approximately IC contracts. We conclude this section374
with a few observations concerning δ-IC contracts. Proofs appear in Appendix C.375
Implementability. A first observation is that, by LP duality, any action can be376
δ-implemented up to tie-breaking even for arbitrarily small δ. Note that this result377
just talks about whether a given action can be δ-incentivized, it may be the case that378
the payments required for this are very high.379
Proposition 2.3. For every principal-agent setting and every δ > 0, every action380
ai can be δ-implemented up to tie-breaking.381
Relaxed vs. exact IC. Our next pair of results concerns the relation between382
IC contracts and δ-IC contracts.383
Proposition 2.4 shows that for every δ-IC contract there is an IC contract with384
approximately the same expected payoff to the principal up to small—and necessary—385
multiplicative and additive losses. Thus relaxing IC to δ-IC increases the expected386
payoff of the principal only to a certain extent. More precisely, Proposition 2.4 shows387
that any δ-IC contract can be transformed into an IC contract that maintains at least388
(1−
√
δ) of the principal’s expected payoff up to an additive loss of (
√
δ− δ). Similar389
results are known in the context of auctions (see [31, 20] for welfare maximization390
and [18] for revenue maximization).391
To state Proposition 2.4, denote by `α=1 the linear contract with parameter α = 1392
(that transfers the full reward from principal to agent).393
Proposition 2.4. Fix a principal-agent setting and δ > 0. Let p be a contract394
that δ-incentivizes action ai. Then the IC contract p
′ defined as (1−
√
δ)p+
√
δ`α=1395
achieves for the principal expected payoff of at least (1 −
√
δ)(Ri − pi) − (
√
δ − δ),396
where Ri − pi is the expected payoff of contract p.397
Proposition 2.5 shows that an additive loss is necessary, as even for tiny δ there398
can be a multiplicative constant-factor gap between the expected payoff of an IC399
contract and a δ-IC one.400
Proposition 2.5. For any δ ∈ (0, 1/2], there exists a principal-agent setting where401
the optimal contract extracts expected payoff OPT but a δ-IC contract extracts expected402
payoff ≥ 43OPT .403
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Relaxed IC with exact IR. In our model, IC implies IR due to the existence404
of a zero-cost action a1, but this is no longer the case for δ-IC. What if we are willing405
to relax IC to δ-IC due to the considerations above, but do not want to give up on406
IR? Suppose we enforce IR by assuming that the agent chooses a δ-IC action only if407
it has expected utility ≥ 0. The following lemma shows that this has only a small408
additive effect on the principal’s expected payoff, allowing us from now on to focus409
on δ-IC contracts (IR can be later enforced by applying the lemma):410
Lemma 2.6. For every δ-IC contract p that achieves expected payoff of Π for411
the principal, there exists a δ-IC and IR contract p′ that achieves expected payoff of412
≥ Π− δ.413
3. Constant number of actions. In this section we begin our exploration of414
the computational problems OPT-CONTRACT and MIN-PAYMENT by considering415
principal-agent settings with a constant number n of actions. For every constant416
n ≥ 3 these problems are NP-hard, and this holds even if the IC requirement is417
relaxed to δ-IC (See Proposition D.1 and Corollary D.2 in Appendix D). As our main418
positive result, we establish the tractability of finding a δ-IC contract that matches419
the expected payoff of the optimal IC contract. In Section 4 we show this result is too420
strong to hold for non-constant values of n (under standard complexity assumptions),421
and in Section 5 we provide an approximation result for general settings.422
To state our results more formally, fix a principal-agent setting and action ai; let423
OPTi be the solution to MIN-PAYMENT for ai (or ∞ if ai cannot be implemented424
up to tie-breaking without loss to the principal); and let OPT be the solution to425
OPT-CONTRACT. Observe that OPT = maxi∈[n]{Ri−OPTi}. Our main results in426
this section are the following:427
Theorem 3.1 (MIN-PAYMENT). There exists an algorithm that receives as428
input a (succinct) principal-agent setting with a constant number of actions and m429
items, an action ai, and a parameter δ > 0, and returns in time poly(m,
1
δ ) a contract430
that δ-incentivizes ai with expected payment ≤ OPTi to the agent.431
Corollary 3.2 (OPT-CONTRACT). There exists an algorithm that receives432
as input a (succinct) principal-agent setting with a constant number of actions and433
m items, and a parameter δ > 0, and returns in time poly(m, 1δ ) a δ-IC contract with434
expected payoff ≥ OPT to the principal.435
Proof. Apply the algorithm from Theorem 3.1 once per action ai to get a con-436
tract that δ-incentivizes ai with expected payoff at least Ri −OPTi to the principal.437
Maximizing over the actions we get a δ-IC contract with expected payoff ≥ OPT to438
the principal.439
Corollary 3.2 shows how to achieve OPT with a δ-IC contract rather than an440
IC one, in the same vein as the CDW results for auctions. A similar result does not441
hold for general n unless P=NP (Corollary 4.3). Note that the δ-IC contract can be442
transformed into an IR one with an additive δ loss by applying Lemma 2.6, and to a443
fully IC one with slightly more loss by Proposition 2.4, where δ can be an arbitrarily444
small inverse polynomial in m.445
In the rest of the section we prove Theorem 3.1.446
An FPTAS for the separation oracle. We begin by stating the separation447
oracle problem, and relating it to a problem called MIN-LR. LP (2.1) formulates448
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MIN-PAYMENT for action ai. Its dual LP (2.2) has constraints of the form:449
(
∑
i′ 6=i
λi′)− 1 ≤
∑
i′ 6=i
λi′
qi′,S
qi,S
.(3.1)450
451
The separation oracle problem is thus: Given n − 1 nonnegative values {λi′} and452
n product distributions qi, {qi′} over the m items, find an outcome S such that453
(
∑
i′ 6=i λi′)−1 >
∑
i′ 6=i λi′
qi′,S
qi,S
(i.e., a violated constraint), or determine that no such454
S exists. Dividing by
∑
i′ 6=i λi′ and letting αi′ = λi′/(
∑
i′ 6=i λi′) we can rewrite (3.1)455
as456
1− 1∑
i′ 6=i λi′
≤
∑
i′ 6=i
(
λi′∑
i′ 6=i λi′
· qi
′,S
qi,S
)
=
∑
i′ 6=i
αi′qi′,S
qi,S
.457
Observe that the αs sum to 1, since
∑
i′ 6=i αi′ =
∑
i′ 6=i λi′/(
∑
i′ 6=i λi′) = 1. We con-458
clude that the separation oracle problem for dual LP (2.2) is equivalent to searching for459
S such that
∑
i′
αi′qi′,S
qi,S
is strictly less than 1− 1/(
∑
i′ 6=i λi′). Minimizing
∑
i′
αi′qi′,S
qi,S
460
over all S is sufficient to solve the problem.461
We can restate this minimization problem over S in the language of likelihood462
ratios (LR). Let the MIN-LR problem be as follows: For constant n and parameter463
m, the input is n − 1 nonnegative weights {αi′} that sum to 1; n − 1 product dis-464
tributions {qi′}; and a product distribution qi; where all product distributions are465
over m items M . The goal is to minimize the likelihood ratio
∑
i′ αi′qi′,S
qi,S
over all466
outcomes S ⊆ M , where the numerator is the likelihood of S under the weighted467
combination distribution
∑
i′ αi′qi′ , and the denominator is the likelihood of S under468
distribution qi. Observe that a weighted combination distribution is not in general a469
product distribution itself, so the problem might be challenging. Denote the optimal470
solution to MIN-LR (the minimum likelihood ratio) by ρ∗.471
Solving the separation oracle problem turns out to be NP-hard (see Proposition472
B.1 in Appendix C),7 but we can give an FPTAS for the MIN-LR problem (Lemma 3.3,473
proof in Appendix E). Lemma 3.4 states the guarantee from applying this FPTAS to474
solve the separation oracle problem.475
Lemma 3.3 (FPTAS). There is an algorithm for the MIN-LR problem that re-476
turns an outcome S with likelihood ratio ≤ (1 + δ)ρ∗ in time polynomial in m, 1δ .477
Lemma 3.4. If the FPTAS for the MIN-LR problem with parameter δ does not
find a violated constraint of dual LP (2.2) (i.e., returns an outcome with likelihood ra-
tio ≥ 1−1/(
∑
i′ 6=i λi′)), then for every S the dual constraint (3.1) holds approximately
up to (1 + δ):
(
∑
i′ 6=i
λi′)− 1 ≤ (1 + δ)
∑
i′ 6=i
λi′
qi′,S
qi,S
.
Proof. Assume there exists S such that (
∑
i′ 6=i λi′) − 1 > (1 + δ)
∑
i′ 6=i λi′
qi′,S
qi,S
.478
Then dividing by (
∑
i′ λi′) and using the definition of ρ
∗ as the minimum likelihood479
ratio we get 1− 1∑
i′ λi′
> (1+δ)ρ∗. Combining this with the guarantee of Lemma 3.3,480
the FPTAS returns S′ with likelihood ratio < 1− 1∑
i′ λi′
, thus identifying a violated481
constraint. This completes the proof.482
7In fact the problem is strongly NP-hard; but because it involves products of the form qi,S =
(
∏
j∈S qi,j)(
∏
j /∈S(1 − qi,j)), the strong NP-hardness does not rule out an FPTAS [47, Theorem
17.12].
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Applying the separation oracle FPTAS: The standard method. Given483
an FPTAS with parameter δ for the separation oracle of a dual LP, for many problems484
it is possible to find in polynomial time an approximately-optimal, feasible solution485
to the primal—see, e.g., [37, 14, 35, 44, 27, 26]. We first describe a fairly standard486
approach in the literature to utilizing a separation oracle FPTAS, which we refer to487
as the standard method, and explain where we must deviate from this approach. The488
proof of Theorem 3.1 then applies an appropriately modified approach.489
The standard method works as follows: Let OPTi be the optimal value of the490
primal (minimization) LP. For a benchmark value Γ, add to the (maximization) dual491
LP a constraint that requires its objective to be at least Γ, and attempt to solve the492
dual by running the ellipsoid algorithm with the separation oracle FPTAS.493
Assume first that the ellipsoid algorithm returns a solution with value Γ. Since
the separation oracle applies the FPTAS, it may wrongly conclude that some solution
is feasible despite a slight violation of one or more of the constraints. For example, if
we were to apply the FPTAS separation oracle from Lemma 3.3 to solve dual LP (2.2),
we could possibly get a solution for which there exists S such that:
∑
i′ 6=i
λi′
qi′,S
qi,S
< (
∑
i′ 6=i
λi′)− 1 ≤ (1 + δ)
∑
i′ 6=i
λi′
qi′,S
qi,S
where the second inequality is by Lemma 3.4. Clearly, the value Γ of an approximately-494
feasible solution may be higher than OPTi. In the standard method, the approx-495
imately-feasible solution can be scaled by 11+δ to regain feasibility while maintaining496
value of Γ1+δ . Scaling thus establishes that
Γ
1+δ ≤ OPTi. Now assume that for some497
(larger) value of Γ, the ellipsoid algorithm identifies that the dual LP is infeasible. In498
this case we can be certain that OPTi < Γ, and we can also find in polynomial time499
a primal feasible solution with value < Γ (more details in the proof of Theorem 3.1500
below).501
Using binary search (in our case over the range [ci, Ri] ⊆ [0, 1] since Ri is the502
maximum the principal can pay without losing money), the standard method finds503
the smallest Γ∗ for which the dual is identified to be infeasible, up to a negligible504
binary search error ε. This gives a primal feasible solution that achieves value Γ∗+ ε,505
and at the same time establishes that (Γ
∗)−
1+δ ≤ OPTi by the scaling argument, which506
is equivalent to Γ
∗
1+δ ≤ OPTi.
8 So the standard method has found an approximately-507
optimal, feasible solution to the primal.508
Applying the separation oracle FPTAS: Our method. The issue with509
applying the standard method to solve MIN-PAYMENT is that the scaling argument510
does not hold. To see this, consider an approximately-feasible dual solution for which511
(
∑
i′ 6=i λi′)− 1 ≤ (1 + δ)
∑
i′ 6=i λi′
qi′,S
qi,S
for every S, and notice that scaling the values512
{λi′} does not achieve feasibility. We therefore turn to an alternative method to prove513
Theorem 3.1.514
Proof of Theorem 3.1. We apply the standard method using the FPTAS with515
parameter δ (see Lemma 3.3) as separation oracle to the following strengthened version516
of dual LP (2.2),9 where the extra (1+δ) multiplicative factor in the constraints makes517
8The notation (Γ∗)− means any number smaller than Γ∗.
9Strengthened duals appear, e.g., in [44, 26].
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them harder to satisfy:518
max
∑
i′ 6=i
λi′(ci − ci′)(3.2)519
s.t. (1 + δ)
(
(
∑
i′ 6=i
λi′)− 1
)
≤
∑
i′ 6=i
λi′
qi′,S
qi,S
∀S ⊆ E, qi,S > 0520
λi′ ≥ 0 ∀i′ 6= i, i′ ∈ [n].521522
Let Γ∗ be the infimum value for which dual LP (3.2) would be identified as infea-523
sible. The ellipsoid algorithm is thus able to find an approximately-feasible solution to524
dual LP (3.2) with objective (Γ∗)−. The key observation is that this solution is fully525
feasible with respect to the original dual LP (2.2). This is because if the separation526
oracle FPTAS does not find a violated constraint of dual LP (3.2), then for every S527
it holds that (
∑
i′ 6=i λi′) − 1 ≤
∑
i′ 6=i λi′
qi′,S
qi,S
(by the same argument as in the proof528
of Lemma 3.4). From the key observation it follows that529
(3.3) (Γ∗)− ≤ OPTi530
(despite the fact that the scaling argument does not hold).531
Now let Γ∗+ ε be the smallest value for which the binary search runs the ellipsoid532
algorithm for dual LP (3.2) and identifies its infeasibility. During its run for Γ∗ +533
ε, the ellipsoid algorithm identifies polynomially-many separating hyperplanes that534
constrain the objective to < Γ∗ + ε. Formulate a “small” primal LP with variables535
corresponding exactly to these hyperplanes. By duality, the small primal LP has a536
solution with objective < Γ∗ + ε, and moreover since the number of variables and537
constraints is polynomial we can find such a solution p∗ in polynomial time. Observe538
that p∗ is also a feasible solution to the primal LP corresponding to dual (3.2) (the539
only difference from the small LP is more variables):540
min (1 + δ)
∑
S⊆E
qi,SpS(3.4)541
s.t. (1 + δ)
( ∑
S⊆E
qi,SpS
)
− ci ≥
∑
S⊆E
qi′,SpS − ci′ ∀i′ 6= i, i′ ∈ [n]542
pS ≥ 0 ∀S ⊆ E.543544
We have thus obtained a contract p∗ that is a feasible solution to LP (3.4) with545
objective (1 + δ)
∑
S⊆E qi,SpS < Γ
∗+ ε. For action ai, this contract pays the agent an546
expected transfer of
∑
S⊆E qi,SpS <
Γ∗+ε
1+δ . We have the following chain of inequalities:547 ∑
S⊆E qi,SpS ≤
(Γ∗)−+ε
1+δ ≤
OPTi+ε
1+δ ≤ OPTi, where the second inequality is by (3.3),548
and the last inequality is by taking the binary search error to be sufficiently small.10549
To complete the proof we must show that p∗ is δ-IC. This holds since the constraints550
of LP (3.4) ensure that for every action ai′ 6= ai, using the notation pi =
∑
S⊆E qi,SpS ,551
we have pi′ − ci′ ≤ (1 + δ)pi − ci ≤ pi − ci + δpi ≤ pi − ci + δ (the last inequality uses552
that pi ≤ Ri ≤ 1 by normalization).553
4. Hardness of approximation. In this section unlike the previous one, the554
number of actions is no longer assumed to be constant. We show a hardness of555
10We use here that OPTi ≥ ci and that the number of bits of precision is polynomial.
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approximation result for optimal contracts, based on the known hardness of approxi-556
mation for MAX-3SAT. In his landmark paper, H̊astad [33] shows that it is NP-hard557
to distinguish between a satisfiable MAX-3SAT instance, and one in which there is558
no assignment satisfying more than 7/8 + α of the clauses, where α is an arbitrarily-559
small constant (Theorems 5.6 and 8.3 in [33]). We build upon this to prove our main560
technical contribution stated in Theorem 4.1, which immediately leads to our main561
results for this section in Corollaries 4.2-4.3.562
Theorem 4.1. Let c ∈ Z, c ≥ 3 be an (arbitrarily large) constant integer. Let563
ε,∆ ∈ R, ε > 0,∆ ∈ [0, 120c ] be such that
ε−2∆1/c
3 ∈ (0,
1
20 ] and (
ε−2∆1/c
3 )
c is an564
(arbitrarily small) constant. Then it is NP-hard to determine whether a principal-565
agent setting has an IC contract extracting full expected welfare, or whether there is566
no ∆-IC contract extracting > 1c + ε of the expected welfare.567
We present two direct implications of Theorem 4.1. First, Corollary 4.2 applies568
to the OPT-CONTRACT problem, and states hardness of approximation within any569
constant of the optimal expected payoff by an IC contract. (A similar result can be570
shown for MIN-PAYMENT; see Appendix F.)571
Corollary 4.2. For any constant c ∈ R, c ≥ 1, it is NP-hard to approximate572
the optimal expected payoff achievable by an IC contract to within a multiplicative573
factor c.574
Corollary 4.2 suggests that in order to achieve positive results, we may want to575
follow the approach of the CDW framework and relax IC to ∆-IC. That is, instead576
of trying to compute in polynomial time an approximately-optimal IC contract, we577
should try to compute in polynomial time a ∆-IC contract with expected payoff that578
is guaranteed to approximately exceed that of the optimal IC contract. The next579
corollary establishes a computational limitation on this approach: Corollary 4.3 fixes580
a constant approximation factor c, and derives ∆ for which a c-approximation by581
a ∆-IC contract is NP-hard to find. (It is also possible to reverse the roles—fix ∆582
and derive a constant approximation factor for which NP-hardness holds.) We shall583
complement this limitation with a positive result in Section 5.584
Corollary 4.3. For any constant c ∈ R, c ≥ 5 and ∆ ≤ ( 14c )
c, it is NP-hard to585
find a ∆-IC contract that guarantees > 2cOPT , where OPT is the optimal expected586
payoff achievable by an IC contract.11587
Proof. The corollary follows from Theorem 4.1 by setting ε = 1c .588
It also follows from Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 4.3 that for every c,∆ as speci-589
fied, it is NP-hard to approximate the optimal expected payoff achievable by a ∆-IC590
contract to within a multiplicative factor c/2. That is, hardness of approximation591
also holds for δ-OPT-CONTRACT.592
In the remainder of the section we prove Theorem 4.1. After a brief overview,593
Section 4.2 sets up some tools for the proof, in Section 4.3 we focus on the special case594
of c = 2, and in Section 4.4 we prove the more general statement for any constant c.595
4.1. Proof overview. It will be instructive to consider first a version of Theo-596
rem 4.1 for the case of c = 2:597
Theorem 4.4. Let ε,∆ ∈ R, ε > 0,∆ ∈ [0, 1202 ] be such that
ε−2∆1/2
3 ∈ (0,
1
20 ]598
and ( ε−2∆
1/2
3 )
2 is an (arbitrarily small) constant. Then it is NP-hard to determine599
11The relevant hardness notion is more accurately FNP-hardness.
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Fig. 1: Outline of a product setting for c = 2.
whether a principal-agent setting has an IC contract extracting full expected welfare,600
or whether there is no ∆-IC contract extracting > 12 + ε of the expected welfare.601
This theorem is already interesting as it shows that even relaxing IC to ∆-IC where602
∆  0, approximating the optimal expected payoff within 65% is computationally603
hard:604
Corollary 4.5. For any ∆ ≤ 1202 , it is NP-hard to find a ∆-IC contract that605
guarantees > 0.65 ·OPT , where OPT is the optimal expected payoff achievable by an606
IC contract.607
Proof. The corollary follows from Theorem 4.4 by setting ε = 320 .608
To establish Theorem 4.4 we present a gap-preserving reduction from any MAX-609
3SAT instance ϕ to a principal-agent setting that we call the “product setting” (the610
reduction appears in Algorithm 4.2 and is analyzed in Proposition 4.15). The product611
setting encompasses a 2-action, 1-item principal-agent “gap setting”, in which any δ-612
IC contract for sufficiently small δ cannot extract much more than 12 of the expected613
welfare (Proposition 4.8). The “gap setting” is coupled with a useful gadget we call614
the “SAT setting”, which is a principal-agent setting with n actions and m items615
whose probabilities depend on the 3SAT instance ϕ. See Figure 1 to see how the gap616
and SAT settings are combined to form the product setting.617
The important property of the SAT setting is the following: if assigning TRUE618
to exactly the variable subset S satisfies the 3SAT formula, then item subset S occurs619
in the SAT setting with probability zero for every action. This property becomes620
useful once the gap actions are added to this gadget (see Figure 1). In particular,621
“gap action 2” achieves set S with non-zero probability, and so a contract paying only622
for set S can incentivize this action by just covering its cost, thus extracting the full623
welfare. If on the other hand, the 3SAT formula is unsatisfiable, then the “gap” in624
the gap setting kicks in and prevents any contract from extracting more than 12 of the625
expected welfare.626
Constant c > 2. The special case of c = 2 captures most ideas behind the proof627
of the more general Theorem 4.1, but the analysis is simplified by the fact that to628
extract more than roughly 12 of the expected welfare in the 2-action gap setting, there629
is a single action that the contract could potentially incentivize. The more general630
case involves gap settings with more actions (the reduction appears in Algorithm 4.3631
and is analyzed in Proposition 4.17). To extract more than ≈ 1c of the expected632
welfare, the contract could potentially incentivize almost any one of these actions633
(Proposition 4.9).634
Barrier to going beyond constant c. Our techniques for establishing Theorem635
4.1 do not generalize beyond constant values of c (the approximation factor). The636
reason for this is that we do not know of (c, ε, f)-gap settings (Definition 4.6) where637
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f(c, ε) = o(εc). As long as f(c, ε) is of order εc, the gap in the MAX-3SAT instance638
we reduce from must be between 7/8 + εc and 1, and this gap problem is known639
to be NP-hard only for constant c. As [33] notes, significantly stronger complexity640
assumptions may lead to hardness for slightly (but not significantly) larger values of c.641
4.2. Main tools used in the proof. In this section we formalize the notions of642
“gap” and “SAT” principal-agent settings as well as the notion of an “average action”,643
which will be useful in proving Theorems 4.1 and 4.4. The term “gap setting” reflects644
the gap between the first-best solution (i.e., the expected welfare), and the second-645
best solution (i.e., the expected payoff to the principal from the optimal contract). It646
will be convenient not to normalize gap settings (and thus also the product settings647
encompassing them). This makes our negative results only stronger, as we show next.648
Unnormalized settings and a stronger δ-IC notion. Before proceeding we649
must define what we mean by a δ-IC contract in an unnormalized setting. Moreover650
we show that if Theorems 4.1 or 4.4 hold for unnormalized settings with the new δ-IC651
notion, then they also hold for normalized settings with the standard δ-IC notion.652
Recall that in a normalized setting, action ai that is δ-incentivized by the contract653
must satisfy δ-IC constraints of the form pi − ci + δ ≥ pi′ − ci′ for every i′ 6= i. In654
an unnormalized setting, an additive δ-deviation from optimality is too weak of a655
requirement; we require instead that ai satisfy δ-IC constraints of the form656
(4.1) (1 + δ)pi − ci ≥ pi′ − ci′ ∀i′ 6= i.657
Two key observations are: (i) The constraints in (4.1) imply the standard δ-IC con-658
straints if pi ≤ 1, as is the case if the setting is normalized; (ii) The constraints in659
(4.1) are invariant to scaling of the setting and contract (i.e., to a change of currency660
of the rewards, costs and payments). By these observations, a δ-IC contract accord-661
ing to the new notion in an unnormalized setting becomes a standard δ-IC contract662
after normalization of the setting and payments, with the same fraction of optimal663
expected welfare extracted as payoff to the principal.664
Assume a negative result holds for unnormalized settings, i.e., it is NP-hard to665
determine between the two cases stated in Theorem 4.1 (or Theorem 4.4). Assume for666
contradiction this does not hold for normalized settings. Then given an unnormalized667
setting, we can simply scale the expected rewards and costs to normalize it, and then668
determine whether or not there is an IC contract extracting full expected welfare. If669
such a contract exists, it is also IC and full-welfare-extracting in the unnormalized670
setting after scaling back the payments. On the other hand, by the discussion above, if671
there is no standard-notion ∆-IC contract extracting a given fraction of the expected672
welfare in the normalized setting, there can also be no such contract with the new673
∆-IC notion in any scaling of the setting. We have thus reached a contradiction to674
NP-hardness. We conclude that proving our negative results for unnormalized settings675
only strengthens these results.676
Gap settings and their construction. We now turn to the definition of gap677
settings.678
Definition 4.6 (Unstructured gap setting). Let f(c, ε) ∈ R≥0 be an increasing679
function where c ∈ Z>0 and ε ∈ R>0. An unstructured (c, ε, f)-gap setting is a680
principal-agent setting such that for every 0 ≤ δ ≤ f(c, ε), the optimal δ-IC contract681
can extract no more than 1c + ε of the expected welfare as the principal’s expected682
payoff.683
For convenience we focus on (structured) gap settings as follows.684
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Definition 4.7 (Gap setting). A (c, ε, f)-gap setting is a setting as in Defini-685
tion 4.6 with the following structure: there is a single item and c actions; the first686
action has zero cost; the last action has probability 1 for the item and maximum687
expected welfare among all actions.688
To construct a gap setting, we construct a principal-agent setting with a single689
item, c actions and parameter γ ∈ R>0, γ < 1. The construction is similar to [23], but690
requires a different analysis. For every i ∈ [c], set the probability of action ai for the691
item to γc−i, and set ai’s cost to ci = (1/γ
i−1)− i+ (i− 1)γ. Set the reward for the692
item to be 1/γc−1. Observe that the expected welfare of action ai is i − (i − 1)γ, so693
the last action has the maximum expected welfare c− (c− 1)γ. This establishes the694
structural requirements from a gap setting (Definition 4.7). Propositions 4.8 and 4.9695
establish the gap requirements from a gap setting (Definition 4.6) for c = 2 and c ≥ 3,696
respectively—the separation between these cases is for clarity of presentation. We use697
the former in Section 4.3, in which we show hardness for the c = 2 case; the latter is698
a generalization to arbitrary-large constant c. See Appendix G for proofs.699
Proposition 4.8 (2-action gap settings). For every ε ∈ (0, 14 ], there exists a700
(2, ε, ε2)-gap setting.701
Proposition 4.9 (c-action gap settings). For every c ≥ 3 and ε ∈ (0, 14 ], there702
exists a (c, ε, εc)-gap setting.703
For concreteness we describe the 2-action gap setting: The agent has c = 2704
actions, which can be thought of as “effort” and “no effort”. Effort has cost 1ε −2 + ε,705
and no effort has cost 0. Without effort the item has probability ε, and with effort the706
probability is 1. The reward associated with the item is 1ε . It is immediate to see that707
the maximum expected welfare (first-best) is 2− ε. In the proof of Proposition 4.8 we708
show that the best an ε2-IC contract can extract is ≈ 1.709
Average actions and SAT settings. The motivation for the next definition710
is that given a contract, for an action to be IC or δ-IC it must yield higher expected711
utility for the agent in comparison to the “average action”. Average actions are thus712
a useful tool for analyzing contracts.713
Definition 4.10 (Average action). Given a principal-agent setting and a subset714
of actions, by the average action we refer to a hypothetical action with the average of715
the subset’s distributions, and average cost. (If a particular subset is not specified, the716
average is taken over all actions in the setting.)717
Another useful ingredient will be SAT settings defined as follows.718
Definition 4.11 (SAT setting). A SAT principal-agent setting corresponds to a719
MAX-3SAT instance ϕ. If ϕ has n clauses and m variables then the SAT setting has720
n actions and m items. Two conditions hold: (1) ϕ is satisfiable if and only if there721
is an item set in the SAT setting that the average action leads to with zero probability;722
(2) If every assignment to ϕ satisfies at most 7/8 + α of the clauses, then for every723
item set S the average action leads to S with probability at least 1−8α2m .724
The following proposition provides a reduction from MAX-3SAT instances to SAT725
settings.726
Proposition 4.12. For every ϕ the reduction in Algorithm 4.1 runs in polyno-727
mial time on input ϕ and returns a SAT setting corresponding to ϕ.728
Proof of Proposition 4.12. We first argue that there is a satisfying assignment to729
the MAX-3SAT instance if and only if there is a set S with 0-probability in every one730
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Algorithm 4.1 SAT setting construction in polytime
Input : A MAX-3SAT instance ϕ with n clauses and m variables.
Output: A principal-agent SAT setting (Definition 4.11) corresponding to ϕ.
begin
Given ϕ, construct a principal-agent setting in which every clause corresponds to
an action with a product distribution, and for every variable there is a correspond-
ing item. If variable j appears in clause i of ϕ as a positive literal, then let item
j’s probability in the ith product distribution be 0, and if it appears as a negative
literal then let item j’s probability be 1. Set all other probabilities to be 12 . We
set the costs of all actions and the rewards for all items to be 0.
end
of the product distributions. First note that there is a natural 1-to-1 correspondence731
between subsets {S} of items and truth assignments to the variables: for every vari-732
able j, if item j ∈ S then assign TRUE and otherwise FALSE. Now consider a set S733
and its corresponding assignment. S has 0-probability in the ith product distribution734
iff either an item in S has probability 0 or an item in S has probability 1 according735
to this distribution. Therefore, in clause i, either one of the TRUE variables appears736
as a positive literal or one of the FALSE variables appears as a negative literal. And737
this is a necessary and sufficient condition for the clause to be satisfied. We conclude738
that S has 0-probability in every product distribution if and only if the corresponding739
assignment satisfies every clause, establishing condition (1) of Definition 4.11. To740
show condition (2), assume that at most 78 + α of the clauses can be satisfied. Con-741
sider the average action whose distribution results from averaging over all actions.742
This distribution has for every S a probability at least ( 18 − α) ·
8
2m =
1−8α
2m , since743
the probability of S is 82m in every distribution corresponding to a clause which the744
assignment corresponding to S does not satisfy. This completes the proof.745
4.3. The c = 2 case: Proof of Theorem 4.4. In this section we present a746
polynomial-time reduction from MAX-3SAT to a product setting, which combines747
gap and SAT settings. The reduction appears in Algorithm 4.2. We then analyze748
the guarantees of the reduction and use them to prove Theorem 4.4. Most of the749
analysis appears in Proposition 4.15, which shows that the reduction in Algorithm750
4.2 is gap-preserving. Some of the results are formulated in general terms so they can751
be reused in the next section (Section 4.4).752
Before turning to Proposition 4.15, we begin with two simple observations about753
the product setting resulting from the reduction.754
Observation 4.13. Partition all actions of the product setting but the last one755
into blocks of n actions each.12 Every action in the ith block has the same expected756
reward for the principal as action ai in the gap setting, and the last action in the757
product setting has the same expected reward as the last action in the gap setting.758
Corollary 4.14. The optimal expected welfares of the product and gap settings759
are the same, and are determined by their respective last actions.760
Proposition 4.15 (Gap preservation by Algorithm 4.2). Let ϕ be a MAX-761
3SAT instance for which either there is a satisfying assignment, or every assignment762
satisfies at most 7/8 + α of the clauses for α ≤ (0.05)2. Let ∆ ≤ (0.05)2. Consider763
12If the number of actions in the gap setting is 2, there is a single such block.
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Algorithm 4.2 Polytime reduction from MAX-3SAT to principal-agent
Input : A MAX-3SAT instance ϕ with n clauses and m variables; a parameter
ε ∈ R≥0.
Output: A principal-agent product setting combining a SAT setting and a gap setting.
begin
Combine the SAT setting corresponding to ϕ (attainable in poly-
time by Proposition 4.12) with a poly-sized (2, ε, ε2)-gap setting (ex-
ists by Proposition 4.8) to get the product setting, as follows:
• The product setting has n + 1 actions and m + 1 items: m “SAT items”
correspond to the SAT setting items, and the last “gap item” corresponds to
the gap setting item.
• The upper-left block of the product setting’s (n + 1) × (m + 1) matrix of
probabilities is the SAT setting’s n ×m matrix of probabilities. The entire
lower-left 1 × m block is set to 12 . The entire upper-right n × 1 block is
set to the probability that action a1 in the gap setting results in the item.
The remaining lower-right 1 × 1 block is set to the probability that the last
action (i.e., action a2) in the gap setting results in the item (recall that this
probability is 1).
• In the product setting, the rewards for the m SAT items are set to 0, and the
reward for the gap item is set as in the gap setting.
• The costs of the first n actions in the product setting are the cost of action
a1 in the gap setting; the cost of the last action in the product setting is the
cost of the last action (i.e., action a2) in the gap setting.
end
the product setting resulting from the reduction in Algorithm 4.2 run on input ϕ, ε =764
3α1/2 + 2∆1/2 ≤ 14 . Then:765
1. If ϕ has a satisfying assignment, the product setting has an IC contract that ex-766
tracts full expected welfare;767
2. If every assignment to ϕ satisfies at most 7/8+α of the clauses, the optimal ∆-IC768
contract can extract no more than 12 + ε of the expected welfare.769
Proof. First, if ϕ has a satisfying assignment, then there is a subset of SAT items770
that has zero probability according to every one of the first n actions. Consider771
the outcome S∗ combining this subset together with the gap item. We construct a772
full-welfare extracting contract: the contract’s payment for S∗ is the cost of the last773
action in the product setting multiplied by 2m (since the probability of S∗ according774
to the last action is 1/2m), and all other payments are set to zero. It is not hard to775
see that the resulting contract makes the agent indifferent among all actions, so by776
tie-breaking in favor of the principal, the principal receives the full expected welfare777
as her payoff.778
Now consider the case that every assignment to ϕ satisfies at most 7/8 +α of the779
clauses, and assume for contradiction that there is a ∆-IC contract p for the product780
setting that extracts more than 12 + ε of the expected welfare. We derive from p a781
δ-IC contract p′ for the (2, ε, ε2)-gap setting where δ ≤ ε2, which extracts more than782
1
2 + ε of the expected welfare. This is a contradiction to the properties of the gap783
setting (Definition 4.6).784
It remains to specify and analyze contract p′ : For brevity we denote the singleton785
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containing the gap item by M ′, and define786
p′(S′) =
1− 8α
2m
∑
S⊆[m]
p(S ∪ S′)∀S′ ⊆M ′,(4.2)787
where S′ is either the singleton containing the gap item or the empty set. The starting788
point of the analysis is the observation that to extract > 12 + ε of the expected welfare789
in the product setting, contract p must ∆-incentivize the last action (this follows790
since the expected rewards and costs of the actions are as in the gap setting by791
Observation 4.13, and so the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 4.8 holds).792
Claim 4.16 below establishes that if contract p ∆-incentivizes the last action in793
the product setting, then contract p′ δ-incentivizes the last action in the gap setting794
for δ = 8α+∆1−8α . So indeed795
δ =
8α
1− 8α
+
∆
1− 8α
796
≤ 9α+ 4∆797
= (3α1/2)2 + (2∆1/2)2798
≤ (3α1/2 + 2∆1/2)2 = ε2,799800
using that α,∆ ≤ (0.05)2 for the first inequality.801
Now observe that the expected payoff to the principal from contract p′ that δ-802
incentivizes the last gap setting action is at least that of contract p that ∆-incentivizes803
the last product setting action: the payments of p′ as defined in (4.2) are the average804
payments of p lowered by a factor of (1 − 8ε), and the expected rewards in the two805
settings are the same (Observation 4.13). The expected welfares in the two settings806
are also equal (Corollary 4.14). We conclude that like contract p in the product807
setting, contract p′ guarantees extraction of > 12 + ε of the expected welfare in the808
gap setting. This leads to a contradiction and completes the proof of Proposition 4.15809
(up to Claim 4.16 proved below).810
The next claim is formulated in general terms so that it can also be used in Section811
4.4. It references the contract p′ defined in (4.2).812
Claim 4.16. Assume every assignment to the MAX-3SAT instance ϕ satisfies at813
most 7/8 + α of its clauses where α < 18 , and consider the product and gap settings814
returned by the reduction in Algorithm 4.2 (resp., Algorithm 4.3). If in the product815
setting the last action is ∆-incentivized by contract p, then in the gap setting the last816
action is δ-incentivized by contract p′ for δ = 8α+∆1−8α .817
Proof. Let gi denote the distribution of action ai in the gap setting and let c be818
the number of actions in this setting. In the product setting, by construction its last819
action assigns probability gc(S
′)
2m to every set S ∪ S
′ such that S contains SAT items820
and S′ ⊆M ′. Thus the expected payment for the last action given contract p is821 ∑
S⊆[m]
∑
S′⊆M ′
gc(S
′)
2m
p(S ∪ S′) = 1
1− 8α
∑
S′⊆M ′
gc(S
′)p′(S′),(4.3)822
823
where the equality follows from the definition of p′ in (4.2). Note that the resulting824
expression in (4.3) is precisely the expected payment for the last action in the gap825
setting given contract p′, multiplied by factor 1/(1− 8α).826
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Similarly, for every i ∈ c consider the average action over the ith block of n actions827
in the product setting.13 Again by construction, the probability this ith average action828
assigns to S ∪ S′ is ≥ gi(S
′)(1−8α)
2m , where we use that the average action of the SAT829
setting has probability ≥ 1−8α2m for S (Definition 4.11). Thus the expected payment830
for the ith average action given contract p is at least831 ∑
S⊆[m]
∑
S′⊆M ′
gi(S
′)(1− 8α)
2m
p(S ∪ S′) =
∑
S′⊆M ′
gi(S
′)p′(S′) ∀i ∈ [c],(4.4)832
833
where again the equality follows from (4.2). Note that the resulting expression in834
(4.4) is precisely the expected payment for action ai in the gap setting given contract835
p′.836
We now use the assumption that in the product setting, contract p ∆-incentivizes837
the last action. This means the agent ∆-prefers the last action to the ith average838
action, which has cost zero. Combining (4.3) and (4.4) we get839
1 + ∆
1− 8α
∑
S′⊆M ′
gc(S
′)p′(S′)− C ≥
∑
S′⊆M ′
gi(S
′)p′(S′) ∀i ∈ [c],(4.5)840
841
where C denotes the cost of the last action in the product and gap settings. By842
definition of δ-IC, Inequality (4.5) immediately implies that in the gap setting, the843
last action is δ-IC given contract p′ where δ = 8α+∆1−8α , thus completing the proof of844
Claim 4.16.845
We can now use Proposition 4.15 to prove Theorem 4.4.846
Proof of Theorem 4.4. Recall that (ε−2∆
1/2)2
9 is a constant ≤ (0.05)
2. Assume847
a polynomial-time algorithm for determining whether a principal-agent setting has a848
(fully-IC) contract that extracts the full expected welfare, or whether no ∆-IC contract849
can extract more than 12 + ε. Then given a MAX-3SAT instance ϕ for which either850
there is a satisfying assignment or every assignment satisfies at most 78 +
(ε−2∆1/2)2
9851
of the clauses, by Proposition 4.15 the product setting (constructed in polynomial852
time) either has a full-welfare extracting contract or has no ∆-IC contract that can853
extract more than 12 + ε. Since the algorithm can determine among these two cases, it854
can solve the MAX-3SAT instance ϕ. But by [33] and since (ε−2∆
1/2)2
9 is a constant,855
we know that there is no polynomial-time algorithm for solving such MAX-3SAT856
instances unless P = NP . This completes the proof of Theorem 4.4.857
4.4. The general case: Proof of Theorem 4.1. In this section we formulate858
and analyze the guarantees of the reduction in Algorithm 4.3.859
Proposition 4.17 (Gap preservation by Algorithm 4.3). Let c ∈ Z, c ≥ 3. Let860
ϕ be a MAX-3SAT instance for which either there is a satisfying assignment, or every861
assignment satisfies at most 7/8 + α of the clauses for α ≤ (0.05)c. Let ∆ ≤ (0.05)c.862
Consider the product setting resulting from the reduction in Algorithm 4.3 run on863
input ϕ, c, ε = 3α1/c + 2∆1/c ≤ 14 . Then:864
1. If ϕ has a satisfying assignment, the product setting has an IC contract that ex-865
tracts full expected welfare;866
2. If every assignment to ϕ satisfies at most 7/8+α of the clauses, the optimal ∆-IC867
contract can extract no more than 1c + ε of the expected welfare.868
13If c = 2 there is a single such block.
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Algorithm 4.3 Generalized polytime reduction from MAX-3SAT to principal-agent
Input : A MAX-3SAT instance ϕ with n clauses and m variables; parameters ε ∈
R≥0 and c ∈ Z>0 where c ≥ 3.
Output: A principal-agent product setting combining copies of a SAT setting and a
gap setting.
begin
Combine multiple copies of the SAT setting corresponding to ϕ (attain-
able in polytime by Proposition 4.12) with a poly-sized (c, ε, εc)-gap set-
ting (exists by Proposition 4.9) to get the product setting, as follows:
• The product setting has cn + 1 actions and m + 1 items: m “SAT items”
correspond to the SAT setting items, and the last “gap item” corresponds to
the gap setting item.
• For every i ∈ [c], consider the ith block of n rows of the product setting’s
(cn + 1) × (m + 1) matrix of probabilities. The ith block consists of row
(i− 1) ·n+ 1 to row i ·n and forms a submatrix of size n× (m+ 1). The first
m columns of the sub-matrix are set to a copy of the SAT setting’s n ×m
matrix of probabilities, and the entire last column is set to the probability
that action ai in the gap setting results in the item. Finally, the first m
entries of the last row of the product setting’s matrix (i.e., row cn + 1) are
set to 12 , and the last entry (the lower-right corner of the matrix) is set to
the probability that the last action in the gap setting results in the item.
• In the product setting, the rewards for the m SAT items are set to 0, and the
reward for the gap item is set as in the gap setting.
• For every i ∈ [c], the costs of the n actions in block i are the cost of action
ai in the gap setting; the cost of the last action in the product setting is the
cost of the last action in the gap setting.
end
Proof. First, if ϕ has a satisfying assignment, then there is a subset of SAT items869
that has zero probability according to every one of the actions in the product setting870
except for the last action, and so we can construct a full-welfare extracting contract as871
in the proof of Proposition 4.15. From now on consider the case that every assignment872
to ϕ satisfies at most 7/8 + α of the clauses, and assume for contradiction there is a873
∆-IC contract p for the product setting that extracts more than 1c + ε of the expected874
welfare.875
Consider the case that p ∆-incentivizes the last action in the product setting.
Then we can derive from it a δ-IC contract p′ for the (c, ε, εc)-gap setting where δ ≤ εc,
which extracts more than 1c + ε of the expected welfare. This is a contradiction to the
properties of the gap setting (Definition 4.6). The construction of p′ and its analysis
are as in the proof of Proposition 4.15 (where Equation (4.2) defines p′), and so are
omitted here except for the following verification: we must verify that indeed δ ≤ εc.
We know from Claim 4.16 that δ = 8α+∆1−8α . As in the proof of Proposition 4.15 this is
≤ 9α+ 4∆, and it is not hard to see that
9α+ 4∆ ≤ (3α1/c)c + (2∆1/c)c ≤ (3α1/c + 2∆1/c)c = εc,
where the first inequality uses that c ≥ 3.876
In the remaining case, p ∆-incentivizes an action ai∗k in the product setting which877
is the kth action in block i∗ ∈ [c] (recall each block has n actions). We derive from p878
a contract p′k (depending on k) for the gap setting that ∆-incentivizes ai∗ at the same879
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expected payment. As in the proof of Proposition 4.17, this means that p′k extracts880
> 1c + ε of the expected welfare in the gap setting. Since ∆ ≤ δ =
8α+∆
1−8α it follows881
from the argument above that ∆ ≤ εc, and so we have reached a contradiction to the882
properties of the gap setting (Definition 4.6).883
We define p′k as follows: Let sk denote the distribution of action ak in the SAT884
setting. For every subset S′ ⊆M ′ of gap items,885
p′k(S
′) =
∑
S⊆[m]
p(S ∪ S′)sk(S) ∀S′ ⊆M ′,(4.6)886
887
where S′ is either the singleton containing the gap item or the empty set.888
For the analysis, let gi denote the distribution of action ai in the gap setting. In889
the product setting, for every i ∈ [c], k ≤ n the expected payment for action aik by890
contract p is891
(4.7)
∑
S∈[m]
∑
S′⊆M ′
sk(S)gi(S
′)p(S ∪ S′).892
In the gap setting, the expected payment for ai by contract p
′
k is
∑
S′⊆M ′ gi(S
′)p′(S′),893
and by definition of p′k in (4.6) this coincides with the expected payment in (4.7). We894
know that contract p ∆-incentivizes ai∗k in the product setting, in particular against895
any action aik where i ∈ [c] \ {i∗} (i.e., against actions in the same position k but in896
different blocks). This implies that contract p′k ∆-incentivizes ai∗ in the gap setting897
against any action ai, completing the proof.898
We can now use Proposition 4.17 to prove Theorem 4.1. The proof is identical to899
that of Theorem 4.4 and so is omitted here.900
5. Approximation guarantees. In this section we show that for any constant901
δ there is a simple, namely linear, δ-IC contract that extracts as expected payoff for902
the principal a cδ-fraction of the optimal welfare, where cδ is a constant that depends903
only on δ. Recall that a linear contract is defined by a parameter α ∈ [0, 1], and pays904
the agent pS = α
∑
j∈S rj for every outcome S ⊆M .905
Theorem 5.1. Consider a principal-agent setting with n actions. For every δ > 0906
let cδ = maxγ∈(0,1)(1 − γ)(dlog1+δ( 1γ )e + 1)
−1. Then there is a δ-IC linear contract907
with expected payoff ALG where908
ALG ≥ cδ ·max
i∈[n]
{Ri − ci}.909
An immediate corollary of Theorem 5.1 is that we can compute a δ-IC linear910
contract that achieves a constant-factor approximation in polynomial time. By Corol-911
lary 4.2 we cannot achieve a similar result for IC (rather than δ-IC) contracts unless912
P = NP . In fact, an even stronger lower bound holds for the class of exactly IC913
linear (or, more generally, separable) contracts. These contracts cannot achieve an914
approximation ratio better than n (see [23] and Appendix H for details).915
5.1. Geometric understanding of linear contracts. To prove Theorem 5.1916
we will rely on the following geometric understanding of linear contracts developed in917
[23]. Fix a principal-agent setting. For a linear contract with parameter α ∈ [0, 1] and918
an action ai, the expected reward Ri =
∑
S qi,SrS is split between the principal and919
the agent, leaving the principal with (1−α)Ri in expected utility and the agent with920
αRi − ci (the sum of the players’ expected utilities is action ai’s expected welfare).921
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α
αRi − ci
−c1
−c2
−c3
R1 − c1
R2 − c2
R3 − c3
α1 α2 α3
Fig. 2: Upper envelope diagram for linear contracts.
The agent’s expected utility for choosing action ai as a function of α is thus a line922
from −ci (for α = 0) to Ri − ci (for α = 1). Drawing these lines for each of the n923
actions, we trace the maximum the agent’s utility for his best action as α goes from924
0 to 1. This gives us the upper envelope diagram for linear contracts in the given925
principal-agent setting.926
Figure 2 illustrates the construction and enables a few key observations that hold927
in general. A first observation is that only actions that appear on the upper envelope928
can be incentivized, and for each action that can be incentivized the smallest α for929
which this action is part of the upper envelope is the one that yields the highest930
expected payoff for the principal. Moreover, if we index actions from left to right as931
they appear on the upper envelope, then they will be sorted by increasing welfare932
Ri − ci, increasing expected reward Ri, and increasing cost ci as these correspond to933
the intercept of αRi − ci with the y-axis at α = 1, the slope of αRi − ci, and the934
intercept of αRi − ci with the y-axis at α = 0.935
In the remainder of this section, we will use IN for the subset of N ≤ n actions936
that are implementable by some linear contract, and we will index them in the order937
in which they appear on the upper envelope. Note that then i < i′ implies that938
ci < ci′ , Ri < Ri′ , and Ri − ci < Ri′ − ci′ . Moreover, maxi{Ri − ci} = RN − cN as939
the action with the highest welfare must appear on the upper envelope.940
For every action ai ∈ IN , we denote by αi the smallest parameter α of a linear941
contract that incentivizes ai. Note that because of our assumption that the minimum942
cost of any action is 0, we have that α1 = 0.943
5.2. Bucketing construction. Our proof of Theorem 5.1 relies on a bucket-944
ing construction that is parametrized by δ > 0 and γ ∈ (0, 1). We describe this945
construction below, and visualize it in Figure 3.946
For a fixed δ > 0 and fixed γ ∈ (0, 1) we subdivide the range [0, 1] of α-parameters947
into κ+ 1 = dlog1+δ( 1γ )e+ 1 buckets as follows:948
B1 = [0, γ(1 + δ)
0),949
Bk = [γ(1 + δ)
k−2, γ(1 + δ)k−1) for k ∈ {2, . . . , κ},950
Bκ+1 = [γ(1 + δ)
κ−1, 1].951952
For each bucket Bk with k ∈ [κ+ 1] we now specify an action ah(k). If bucket Bk953
has a single action ai that is implementable with an α ∈ Bk, then we let ah(k) = ai.954
Otherwise, if bucket Bk has more than one action ai that is implementable with an955
α ∈ Bk, then we let ah(k) be the action ai with the highest expected reward that is956
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α
αRi − ci
αh(1)
αh(0),h(1) αh(1),h(2) αh(2),h(3)
B1 B2 B3
ah(1) = a2
ah(2) = a2
ah(3) = a4
Fig. 3: Bucketing construction.
implementable with an α ∈ Bk.957
Next for each bucket Bk and associated action ah(k) we define a value of α, which958
we will denote by αh(k−1),h(k). For k = 1 we set αh(k−1),h(k) = 0. For k ≥ 2 we959
distinguish between the case where Bk has exactly one implementable action, and the960
case where it has more than one. If it has exactly one implementable action we set961
αh(k−1),h(k) = γ(1 + δ)
k−2, i.e., we define αh(k−1),h(k) to be the left endpoint of Bk.962
Note that in this case h(k) = h(k − 1) and so963
Rh(k) − ch(k) = Rh(k−1) − ch(k−1).964
Otherwise, if Bk has more than one implementable action, then we have h(k) >965
h(k − 1) and therefore also Rh(k) > Rh(k−1), and we set966
αh(k−1),h(k) =
ch(k) − ch(k−1)
Rh(k) −Rh(k−1)
,967
i.e., in this case αh(k−1),h(k) is the α that makes the agent indifferent between actions968
ah(k−1) and ah(k).969
5.3. Upper bound on the optimal welfare. The first key ingredient in our970
proof of Theorem 5.1 will be the following upper bound on the optimal welfare971
maxi∈[n](Ri−ci) = RN −cN in terms of the parameters of the bucketing construction972
in Section 5.2 for any δ > 0 and γ ∈ (0, 1).973
Lemma 5.2. Fix δ > 0 and γ ∈ (0, 1) and consider the bucketing construction974
from Section 5.2. Then,975
max
i∈[n]
(Ri − ci) = RN − cN ≤
κ+1∑
k=1
(1− αh(k−1),h(k))Rh(k).976
To prove Lemma 5.2 we rely on the following observation from [23].977
Observation 5.3. Consider two actions ai, ai′ such that ai has higher expected978
reward and higher welfare than ai′ , i.e., Ri > Ri′ and Ri − ci > Ri′ − ci′ , and let979
αi′,i = (ci − ci′)/(Ri −Ri′). Then980
(Ri − ci)− (Ri′ − ci′) ≤ (1− αi′,i)Ri.981
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Proof of Lemma 5.2. We argue by induction that for all k ≥ 1, Rh(k) − ch(k) ≤982 ∑k
i=1(1− αh(i−1),h(i))Rh(i). For k = 1, recall that αh(0),h(1) = 0 by definition, and it983
trivially holds that Rh(1) − ch(1) ≤ Rh(1). Now assume that the inequality holds for984
k − 1, i.e.,985
Rh(k−1) − ch(k−1) ≤
k−1∑
i=1
(1− αh(i−1),h(i))Rh(i).(5.1)986
987
If Bk is a bucket that contains only one implementable action, then h(k) = h(k−1)988
and thus (Rh(k)− ch(k))− (Rh(k−1)− ch(k−1)) = 0. So, in particular, (Rh(k)− ch(k))−989
(Rh(k−1) − ch(k−1)) ≤ (1− αh(k−1),h(k))Rh(k).990
Otherwise, if Bk is a bucket that contains more than one implementable action,991
then h(k) > h(k−1) and thus Rh(k) > Rh(k−1) and Rh(k)− ch(k) > Rh(k−1)− ch(k−1).992
So we can apply Observation 5.3 to actions ah(k) and ah(k−1). This shows (Rh(k) −993
ch(k))− (Rh(k−1) − ch(k−1)) ≤ (1− αh(k−1),h(k))Rh(k).994
We conclude that in both cases (Rh(k) − ch(k)) − (Rh(k−1) − ch(k−1)) ≤ (1 −995
αh(k−1),h(k))Rh(k). Adding this inequality to inequality (5.1) we obtain996
Rh(k) − ch(k) ≤
k∑
i=1
(1− αh(i−1),h(i))Rh(i),997
998
as claimed.999
5.4. Approximate implementability. The second crucial observation con-1000
cerning the bucketing construction in Section 5.2 for any fixed δ > 0 and γ ∈ (0, 1)1001
concerns the (approximate) implementability of the actions ah(k) for k ∈ [κ+ 1].1002
For k = 1, action ah(1) is incentivized exactly at α1. For k ≥ 2 and buckets Bk1003
that contain only one implementable action, action ah(k) is incentivized exactly at1004
αh(k−1),h(k). For k ≥ 2 and buckets Bk that contain more than one implementable1005
action, action ah(k) is not incentivized exactly at αh(k−1),h(k), but—as the following1006
lemma shows—it is δ-incentivized.1007
Lemma 5.4. Fix δ > 0 and γ ∈ (0, 1) and consider the bucketing construction1008
from Section 5.2. For any k ∈ {2, . . . , κ + 1} such that Bk contains more than one1009
implementable action, the linear contract with α = αh(k−1),h(k) ensures that1010
αRh(k) − ch(k) + δ ≥ αRi − ci for every i ∈ [n].10111012
Proof. The lines Rh(k)− ch(k) and Rh(k−1)− ch(k−1) intersect at αh(k−1),h(k). By1013
construction, their intersection must fall between, on the one hand, the left endpoint1014
γ(1 + δ)k−2 of the bucket in which αh(k) falls, and αh(k) on the other hand. This1015
shows that (1 + δ)αh(k−1),h(k) ≥ (1 + δ)γ(1 + δ)k−2 = γ(1 − δ)k−1 ≥ αh(k). Com-1016
bining this with the fact that ah(k) is incentivized exactly at αh(k), we obtain that1017
αh(k−1),h(k)Rh(k)− ch(k) + δ ≥ (1 + δ)αh(k−1),h(k)Rh(k)− ch(k) ≥ αh(k)Rh(k)− ch(k) ≥1018
αh(k)Ri− ci for all i ∈ [n], where the first inequality holds since Rh(k) ≤ 1 by normal-1019
ization.1020
5.5. Proof of the approximation guarantee. We are now ready to prove1021
Theorem 5.1. We will use the bucketing construction from Section 5.2, and we will1022
use Lemma 5.2 to derive an upper bound on the optimal welfare and Lemma 5.4 to1023
derive a lower bound on what a δ-IC linear contract can achieve.1024
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Proof of Theorem 5.1. Fix some δ > 0 and some γ ∈ (0, 1), and consider the1025
bucketing construction from Section 5.2 for these parameters. Write ALG for the1026
payoff achievable with a δ-IC linear contract, and OPT for the maximum welfare of1027
any action. For the linear contract we consider choosing the best α among αh(1) and1028
αh(k−1),h(k) for k ≥ 2. We then have,1029
ALG ≥ max{(1− αh(1))Rh(1), (1− αh(1),h(2))Rh(2), . . . , (1− αh(κ),h(κ+1))Rh(κ+1)}
≥ (1− γ) max{(1− αh(0),h(1))Rh(1), (1− αh(1),h(2))Rh(2),1030
. . . , (1− αh(κ),h(κ+1))Rh(κ+1)}
≥ (1− γ) 1
κ+ 1
κ+1∑
i=1
(1− αh(k−1),h(k))Rh(k)
≥ (1− γ) 1
κ+ 1
OPT,1031
1032
where for the first inequality we use Lemma 5.4, for the second inequality we use1033
that αh(1) ≤ γ and that αh(0),h(1) ≥ 0, for the third inequality we lower bound the1034
maximum with the average, and for the final inequality we use Lemma 5.2.1035
The proof is completed by observing that for a fixed δ > 0 the above argument1036
applies for all γ ∈ (0, 1). We can thus conclude that1037
ALG ≥ max
γ∈(0,1)
(1− γ) 1
dlog1+δ( 1γ )e+ 1
OPT,1038
as claimed.1039
6. Black-box model. We conclude by considering a black-box model which con-1040
cerns non-necessarily succinct principal-agent settings. In this model, the principal1041
knows the set of actions An, the cost ci of each action ai ∈ An, the set of items M1042
and the rewards rj for each item j ∈ M , but does not know the probabilities qi,S1043
that action ai assigns to outcome S ⊆ M . Instead, the principal has query access to1044
the distributions {qi}. Upon querying distribution qi of action ai, a (random) set is1045
returned where S is selected with probability qi,S . Our goal is to study how well a1046
δ-IC contract in this model can approximate the optimal IC contract if limited to a1047
polynomial number of queries (where the guarantees should hold with high probability1048
over the random samples). Black-box models have been studied in other algorithmic1049
game theory contexts such as signaling—see [22] for a successful example.1050
Let η = min{qi,S | i ∈ [n], S ⊆M, qi,S 6= 0} be the minimum non-zero probability1051
of any set of items under any of the actions. Note that then either qi,S = 0 or qi,S ≥ η1052
for every S. In Section 6.1 we address the case in which η is inverse super-polynomial1053
and obtain a negative result; in Section 6.2 we show a positive result for the case of1054
inverse polynomial η.1055
6.1. Inverse super-polynomial probabilities. We show a negative result for1056
the case where the minimum probability η is inverse super-polynomial, by proving1057
that poly(1/
√
η) samples are required to obtain a constant factor multiplicative ap-1058
proximation better than ≈ 1.15. The negative result holds even for succinct settings,1059
in which the unknown distributions are product distributions.1060
The basic idea is to construct two nearby instances, which, with high probability,1061
cannot be distinguished with polynomially many samples, and for which no single1062
contract can simultaneously be good for both settings.1063
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Theorem 6.1. Assume η ≤ η0 = 1/625 and δ ≤ δ0 = 1/100. Even with n = 21064
actions and m = 2 items, achieving a multiplicative ≤ 1.15 approximation to the1065
optimal IC contract through a δ-IC contract, where the approximation guarantee is1066
required to hold with probability at least 1−γ, may require at least s ≥ − log(γ)/(9√η)1067
queries.1068
Proof. We consider a scenario with two settings, both of which have n = 2 actions1069
and m = 2 items, and which differ only in the probabilities of the items given the1070
second action. Let τ be some constant > 2 (to be fixed later), and let µ =
√
η
τ . Let1071
β = (1 + 1τ2 )
−1 and note that β < 1.1072
Setting I:
r1 =
β
τ2µ r2 =
β
τ2µ
a1 : τµ τµ c1 = 0
a2 : τ
2µ µ c2 =
τ−1
τ3
1
1−µβ
1073
Setting II:
r1 =
β
τ2µ r2 =
β
τ2µ
a1 : τµ τµ c1 = 0
a2 : µ τ
2µ c2 =
τ−1
τ3
1
1−µβ
1074
Note further that the minimum probability of any set of items in both settings is1075
q2,{1,2} = τ
2µ2 = η, as required by definition of η.1076
The expected reward achieved by the two actions in the two settings is R1 =1077
2β/τ < 1 and R2 = (1 + 1/τ
2)β = 1. Moreover, the cost of action 2 is c2 ≤ β/τ2. So1078
the welfare achieved by the two actions is R1 − c1 < β and R2 − c2 ≥ β.1079
In both settings the optimal IC contract incentivizes action 2, by paying only for1080
the set of items that maximizes the likelihood ratio. In Setting 1 this is {1}, in Setting1081
2 it is {2}. The payment for this set in both cases is c2/(τ2µ(1− µ)− τµ(1− τµ)) =1082
c2/(τ
2µ−τµ). This leads to an expected payment of τ2µ(1−µ)·c2/(τ2µ−τµ) = β/τ2.1083
The resulting payoff (and our benchmark) is therefore R2 − β/τ2 = β.1084
We now argue that if we cannot distinguish between the two settings, then we1085
can only achieve a ≈ 1.1568 approximation. Of course, we can always pay nothing1086
and incentivize action 1, but this only yields a payoff of 2β/τ . We can also try to1087
δ-incentivize action 2 in both settings, by paying for outcome {1} and {2}. But (as1088
we show below) the payoff that we can achieve this way is (for δ → 0 and µ→ 0) at1089
most (1 + 1/τ2− (τ2 + 1)/((τ −1)τ3)β. Now max{2/τ, 1 + 1/τ2− (τ2 + 1)/((τ −1)τ3}1090
is minimized at τ = 1 +
√
2 where it is 2/(1 +
√
2) ≈ 0.8284. The upper bound on the1091
payoff from action 2 for this choice of τ is actually increasing in both µ and δ and equal1092
to ≈ 0.8644 ·β at the upper bounds µ0 =
√
η0/(2
2) = 1/100 and δ0 = 1/100, implying1093
that the best we can achieve without knowing the setting is a ≈ 1/0.8644 ≈ 1.15681094
approximation.1095
So if we want to achieve at least a ≤ 1.15 approximation with probability at least1096
1 − γ, then we need to be able to distinguish between the two settings with at least1097
this probability. A necessary condition for being able to distinguish between the two1098
settings is that we see at least some item in one of our queries to action 2. So,1099
1− γ ≤ 1− (1− τ2µ)2s,1100
which implies that s ≥ log(γ)/(2 log(1− τ2µ) ≥ − log(γ)/(2 ·µ · τ2) ≥ − log(γ)/(18µ).1101
Plugging in µ we get s ≥ − log(γ)/(18
√
µ
τ ) > − log(γ)/(9
√
µ).1102
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We still need to prove our claims regarding the payoff that we can achieve if we1103
want to δ-incentivize action 2 in both settings. To this end consider the IC constraints1104
for δ-incentivizing action 2 over action 1 in Setting I and Setting II, respectively:1105
τ2µ(1− µ)p{1} + (1− τ2µ)µp{2} − c2 ≥1106
τµ(1− τµ)p{1} + (1− τµ)τµp{2} − δ, and1107
(1− τ2µ)µp{1} + τ2µ(1− µ)p{2} − c2 ≥1108
τµ(1− τµ)p{1} + (1− τµ)τµp{2} − δ.11091110
Adding up these constraints yields1111
(τ2µ(1− µ) + (1− τ2µ)µ− 2τµ(1− τµ)) · (p{1} + p{2}) ≥ 2c2 − 2δ.11121113
We maximize the minimum performance across the two settings by choosing p{1} =1114
p{2}. Letting p = p{1} = p{2} we thus obtain1115
(τ2µ(1− µ) + (1− τ2µ)µ− 2τµ(1− τµ))p ≥ c2 − δ.11161117
It follows that1118
p ≥ c2 − δ
τ2µ+ µ− 2τµ
.1119
The performance of the optimal contract that δ-incentivizes action 2 in both settings1120
thus achieves an expected payoff of1121
R2 − (τ2µ(1− µ) + (1− τ2µ)µ)
c2 − δ
τ2µ+ µ− 2τµ
= R2 −
τ2(1− 2µ) + 1
(τ − 1)2
(c2 − δ).1122
1123
Plugging in R2 and c2 and letting δ → 0 and µ → 0 we obtain the aforementioned1124
1 + 1/τ2 − (τ2 + 1)/((τ − 1)τ3)β. Finally, to see that the expected payoff evaluated1125
at τ = 1 +
√
2 > 2 is increasing in both δ and µ observe that the derivative in δ is1126
simply the probability term (τ2(1− 2µ) + 1)/(τ − 1)2 which is positive and that both1127
this probability term and the cost c2 are decreasing in µ implying that as µ increases1128
we subtract less.1129
6.2. Inverse polynomial probabilities. We show a positive result for the case1130
where the minimum probability η is inverse polynomial. Namely, let OPT denote the1131
expected payoff of the optimal IC contract; then with poly(n,m, 1η ,
1
ε ,
1
γ ) queries it1132
is possible to find, with probability at least (1 − γ), a 4ε-IC contract with expected1133
payoff at least OPT − 5ε. Formally:1134
Theorem 6.2. Fix ε > 0, and assume ε ≤ 1/2. Fix distributions Q such that1135
qi,S ≥ η for all i ∈ [n] and S ⊆ M . Denote the expected payoff of the optimal1136
IC contract for distributions Q by OPT . Then there is an algorithm that with s =1137
(3 log( 2nηγ ))/(ηε
2) queries to each action and probability at least 1 − γ, computes a1138
contract p̃ which (i) is 4ε-IC on the actual distributions Q; and (ii) has expected1139
payoff Π on the actual distributions satisfying Π ≥ OPT − 5ε.1140
We will show that the optimal 2ε-IC contract for the empirical distributions ob-1141
tained from s = (3 log( 2nηγ ))/(ηε
2) queries to each action has the desired properties.141142
14Note that this contract can be computed in polynomial time by solving n−1 LPs similar to the
MIN-PAYMENT LP, with an appropriately relaxed IC constraint, because there will be at most ns
outcomes with a non-zero probability.
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Our proof goes through a series of technical lemmas (Lemmas 6.3 to 6.7), which we1143
describe and state below, and whose proofs appear in Appendix I.1144
The first lemma (Lemma 6.3) establishes that s = (3 log( 2nηγ ))/(ηε
2) queries to1145
each action suffice to ensure that with probability at least 1− γ all empirical proba-1146
bilities are within an error of at most ε of the actual probabilities.1147
Lemma 6.3. Consider the algorithm that issues s queries to each action i ∈ N ,1148
and sets q̃i,S to be the empirical probability of set S under action i. With s =1149
(3 log( 2nηγ ))/(ηε
2) queries to each action, with probability at least 1− γ, for all i ∈ [n]1150
and S ⊆M ,1151
(1− ε)qi,S ≤ q̃i,S ≤ (1 + ε)qi,S .11521153
The remaining lemmas (Lemma 6.4 to Lemma 6.7) all operate on the assumption1154
that the empirical probabilities are close to the actual probabilities.1155
The first two of these lemmas—Lemma 6.4 and Lemma 6.5—show that IC and1156
δ-IC are approximately preserved when switching from the actual distributions to the1157
empirical distributions, and vice versa.1158
We will use Lemma 6.4 to relate the performance of the optimal 2ε-IC contract1159
for the empirical distributions to that of the optimal IC contract for the actual dis-1160
tributions. We will use Lemma 6.5 to show that the optimal 2ε-IC contract for the1161
empirical distributions is 4ε-IC under the actual distributions.1162
Lemma 6.4. Suppose that (1−ε)qi,S ≤ q̃i,S ≤ (1+ε)qi,S for all i ∈ [n] and S ⊆M .1163
Consider contract p. If ai is the action that is incentivized by this contract under the1164
actual probabilities Q, then the payoff of ai under the empirical distributions Q̃ is at1165
least as high as that of any other action up to an additive term of 2ε.1166
Lemma 6.5. Suppose that (1−ε)qi,S ≤ q̃i,S ≤ (1+ε)qi,S for all i ∈ [n] and S ⊆M .1167
Consider contract p̃. If ai is the action that is δ-incentivized by this contract under1168
the empricial probabilities Q̃, then the payoff of ai under the actual distributions is at1169
least as high as that of any other action up to an additive term of δ + 2ε. (δ + 2ε)-IC1170
for the actual probabilities Q.1171
The final two lemmas (Lemma 6.6 and Lemma 6.7) relate the payoff of an action1172
on the actual distributions to that on the empirical distributions, and vice versa.1173
We will use these lemmas to connect the performance of the two aforementioned1174
contracts under the empirical and actual distributions.1175
Lemma 6.6. Suppose that (1 − ε)qi,S ≤ q̃i,S ≤ (1 + ε)qi,S for all i ∈ [n] and1176
S ⊆ M . If action ai achieves payoff Π̃ under contract p̃ when evaluated on the1177
empirical distributions Q̃, then it achieves payoff Π ≥ Π̃ − 2ε when evaluated on the1178
actual distributions Q.1179
Lemma 6.7. Assume ε ≤ 1/2. Suppose that (1− ε)qi,S ≤ q̃i,S ≤ (1 + ε)qi,S for all1180
i ∈ [n] and S ⊆ M . If action ai achieves payoff P under contract p when evaluated1181
on the actual distributions Q, then it achieves payoff P̃ ≥ P − 3ε when evaluated on1182
the empirical distributions Q.1183
We are now ready to prove the theorem.1184
Proof of Theorem 6.2. Let Q̃ denote the empirical distributions that result from1185
querying each action s times. By Lemma 6.3, with probability at least 1 − γ, the1186
empirical probabilities obtained in this way will satisfy (1− ε)qi,S ≤ q̃i,S ≤ (1 + ε)qi,S1187
for all i ∈ [n] and S ⊆M .1188
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Denote the optimal 2ε-IC contract for the empirical distributions Q̃ by p̃ . We will1189
use Π̃ for the expected payoff that this contract achieves under the empirical distribu-1190
tions Q̃, and Π for the expected payoff that it achieves under the actual distributions1191
Q. Likewise, denote by p the optimal IC contract for the actual distributions Q. We1192
will write P for the expected payoff that it achieves under the actual distributions Q,1193
and P̃ for its expected payoff under the empirical distributions Q̃.1194
By Lemma 6.5, contract p̃ which is 2ε-IC on Q̃ is 4ε-IC on Q, as claimed. Further-1195
more, by Lemma 6.4, contract p which is IC on Q is 2ε-IC on Q̃. Since p̃ is the optimal1196
such contract, this implies that Π̃ ≥ P̃ . Together with Lemma 6.6 and Lemma 6.7 we1197
thus obtain1198
Π ≥ Π̃− 2ε ≥ P̃ − 2ε ≥ P − 5ε,11991200
which completes the proof.1201
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Appendix A. Tractability of linear and separable contracts. Proposi-1304
This manuscript is for review purposes only.
THE COMPLEXITY OF CONTRACTS 33
tion A.1 establishes that the problem of finding an optimal IC or δ-IC linear resp. sep-1305
arable contract is tractable.1306
Proposition A.1. Let δ ≥ 0. Given a principal-agent setting, an optimal linear1307
(resp., separable) δ-IC contract can be found in polynomial time.1308
Proof. The problem of finding an optimal linear (resp., separable) δ-IC contract1309
for incentivizing any action ai can be formulated as a polynomial-sized LP with 11310
variable (resp., m variables) representing the contract’s parameter α (resp., the item1311
payments {pj}), and n− 1 δ-IC constraints.1312
Appendix B. Intractability of the ellipsoid method. In this appendix we1313
establish the intractability of the ellipsoid method for MIN-PAYMENT, except for1314
the special case of n = 2. Recall LP (2.1) for the MIN-PAYMENT problem. Its dual1315
is as follows, where {λi′} are n− 1 nonnegative variables (one for every action other1316
than i):1317
max
∑
i′ 6=i
λi′(ci − ci′)1318
s.t.
(∑
i′ 6=i
λi′
)
− 1 ≤
∑
i′ 6=i
λi′
qi′,S
qi,S
∀S ⊆ E, qi,S > 0,1319
λi′ ≥ 0 ∀i′ 6= i, i′ ∈ [n].13201321
Consider applying the ellipsoid method to solve LP (2.1) for action ai. The sepa-1322
ration oracle problem is: Given an instantiation of the dual variables {λi′}, consider1323
the combination distribution
∑
i′ 6=i λi′qi′ , which is a convex combination of the prod-1324
uct distributions {qi′}. To find a violated constraint of the dual LP we need to find1325
a set S for which the likelihood ratio between the combination distribution and the1326
product distribution qi is sufficiently small.1327
Note that a combination distribution is not itself a product distribution.15 There-1328
fore solving the separation oracle is not easy and in fact it is an NP-hard problem1329
even for n = 3, as formalized in Proposition B.1. In the special case of n = 2, the1330
combination distribution is a product distribution. By taking S to be all items that1331
are more likely according to qi than according to the combination distribution, we1332
minimize the likelihood ratio and solve the separation oracle. (This is one way to1333
conclude that OPT-CONTRACT with n = 2 is tractable.)1334
Proposition B.1. Solving the separation oracle of dual LP (2.2) is NP-hard for1335
n ≥ 3.1336
Proof. Rather than prove Proposition B.1 directly, it is enough to point the reader1337
to Corollary D.2, which establishes the NP-hardness of MIN-PAYMENT.1338
Remark B.2. Proposition B.1 immediately holds for δ-IC as well, i.e., for the1339
separation oracle of dual LP (3.2). This dual corresponds to primal LP (3.4) solving1340
MIN-PAYMENT for δ-IC contracts. This is simply because the separation oracle1341
problem of dual LP (3.2) is identical to that of dual LP (2.2).1342
15For example, consider a fifty-fifty mix between the following two product distributions over two
items: a point mass on the empty set, and a point mass on the grand bundle. This combination
distribution has probability 1
2
for the empty set and probability 1
2
for the grand bundle, and the
item marginals are 1
2
. A product distribution with item marginals of 1
2
has probability 1
4
for every
set.
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Appendix C. Properties of δ-IC contracts. In this appendix we give the1343
proofs that were omitted from Section 2.4.1344
Proof of Proposition 2.3. Action ai can be δ-implemented if and only if LP C.11345
has a feasible solution.1346
min 0(C.1)1347
s.t.(1 + δ)
∑
S⊆E
qi,SpS
− ci ≥ ∑
S⊆E
qi′,SpS − ci′∀i′ 6= i, i′ ∈ [n]1348
pS ≥ 0 ∀S ⊆ E.1349
Consider the dual:1350
max
∑
i′ 6=i
λi′(ci − ci′)(C.2)1351
s.t.(1 + δ)qi,S
∑
i′ 6=i
λi′ ≤
∑
i′ 6=i
λi′qi′,S∀S ⊆ E, qi,S > 01352
λi′ ≥ 0 ∀i′ 6= i, i′ ∈ [n].1353
Since qi and {qi′} are distributions and δ > 0, the only feasible solution to the dual1354
LP (C.2) is λi′ = 0 for every i
′ 6= i. The dual is feasible and bounded, hence the1355
primal must be feasible, completing the proof.1356
Proof of Proposition 2.4. The expected payoff of action ai under the interpolation1357
contract p′ is1358
Ri − [(1−
√
δ)pi +
√
δRi] = (1−
√
δ)(Ri − pi).1359
We will argue that for every action ai′ with i
′ 6= i, either i′ is not incentivized by p′1360
(Case 1) or its expected payoff is sufficiently high (Case 2).1361
Case 1: Assume Ri − (1 +
√
δ)pi > Ri′ − pi′ . We claim that in this case ai is1362
preferred over ai′ under contract p
′. Namely,1363
(1−
√
δ)pi +
√
δRi − ci = (1 + δ)pi − ci +
√
δ(Ri − (1 +
√
δ)pi)1364
≥ pi′ − ci′ +
√
δ(Ri − (1 +
√
δ)pi)1365
> pi′ − ci′ +
√
δ(Ri′ − pi′)1366
= (1−
√
δ)pi′ +
√
δRi′ − ci′ ,13671368
where we used that action ai is δ-incentivized under p for the first inequality, and the1369
second inequality holds by assumption because we are in Case 1.1370
Case 2: Assume now that Ri − (1 +
√
δ)pi ≤ Ri′ − pi′ . In this case the expected1371
payoff achieved by action ai′ is high. Namely,1372
Ri′ − (1−
√
δ)pi′ −
√
δRi′ = (1−
√
δ)(Ra′i − pa′i)1373
≥ (1−
√
δ)(Ri − (1 +
√
δ)pi)1374
= (1−
√
δ)(Ri − pi)− (1−
√
δ)
√
δpi,13751376
where the inequality holds by assumption because we are in Case 2.1377
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Proof of Proposition 2.5. Consider the following principal-agent setting parame-
terized by δ and ε > 0. LetM = ε/δ. There are n = 2 actions and m = 2 items. The
probabilities of the items given the actions is described by the following matrix(
1
4
2ε
3(M+ε)
0 1
)
,
where the first column corresponds to item 1 and the second column to item 2. Set1378
the rewards to be r1 =
4ε
3 for item 1 and r2 =M+ ε for item 2 (notice r1 < r2), and1379
the costs to be c1 = 0 and c2 =M− Mε2(M+ε) > 0. Observe that the expected rewards1380
are R1 = ε and R2 =M+ ε.1381
Claim C.1. OPT = ε.1382
Proof of Claim C.1. The expected payoff from letting the agent chose the zero-1383
cost action a1 is R1 = ε. Can we get any better by incentivizing a2? The optimal1384
contract for incentivizing the costly action in a 2-action setting is well-understood1385
(see e.g. [23]): The only positive payment should be for the single subset of items1386
maximizing the likelihood that the agent has chosen action a2; in our case this is1387
the subset {2} containing item 2 only. Observe that its probability given action 1 is1388
ε
2(M+ε) . The 2-action characterization also specifies the payment for this outcome,1389
setting it at p{2} = c2/
(
1− ε2(M+ε)
)
= M. Subtracted from R2 we get expected1390
payoff of ε from optimally incentivizing a2.1391
Claim C.2. Contract p that pays M− ε3 for outcome S = {2} and 0 otherwise1392
δ-incentivizes action a2 with expected payoff R2 − p2 = 43ε.1393
Proof of Claim C.2. We show action a2 is δ-IC: The agent’s expected utility from1394
a1 is
ε
2(M+ε)p2 =
ε(3M−ε)
6(M+ε) , and from a2 given contract (1 + δ)p it is (1 + δ)p2 − c2 =1395
(1 + εM )(M−
ε
3 ) −M +
Mε
2(M+ε) =
ε(2M−ε)
3M +
Mε
2(M+ε) . It can be verified that the1396
former is less than the latter for δ ≤ 12 .1397
Putting these claims together completes the proof of Proposition 2.5.1398
Proof of Lemma 2.6. Fix a principal-agent setting. Let ai be the action that is δ-1399
incentivized by contract p and assume ai is not IR. Observe that the agent’s expected1400
utility from ai is ≥ −δ (otherwise ai would not be δ-IC with respect to a1, which1401
has expected utility ≥ 0 for the agent). First, if Π > δ, then let p′ be identical to p1402
except for an additional δ payment for every outcome. Contract p′ still δ-incentivizes1403
action ai, but now the agent’s expected utility from ai is ≥ 0, as required. Otherwise1404
if Π ≤ δ, let p′ be the contract with all-zero payments. The expected payoff to the1405
principal is zero, which is at most an additive δ loss compared to Π.1406
Appendix D. Hardness with a constant number of actions. In this1407
appendix we show NP-hardness of the two computational problems related to optimal1408
contracts when the number of actions n is constant. Appendices D.1 and D.2 prove1409
hardness of δ-OPT-CONTRACT (Proposition D.1), from which hardness of δ-MIN-1410
PAYMENT follows by the reduction in Section 2 (Corollary D.2).1411
Proposition D.1. δ-OPT-CONTRACT is NP-hard even for n = 3 actions.1412
Corollary D.2. δ-MIN-PAYMENT is NP-hard even for n = 3 actions.1413
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D.1. The computational problem MIN-MAX-PROB. It will be conve-1414
nient to reduce to δ-OPT-CONTRACT from a computational problem we call MIN-1415
MAX-PROB, which is a variant of MIN-MAX PRODUCT PARTITION [40] and thus1416
NP-hard.1417
• Input: A product distribution q over m items such that for every item j, its1418
probability qj is equal to
1
aj+1
where aj is an integer ∈ [3, amax] (log amax is1419
polynomial in m).1420
• Output: YES iff there exists a subset of items S∗ such that qS∗ = `A, where1421
A =
√∏
j aj and ` =
∏
j qj .1422
We now take a closer look at MIN-MAX-PROB. Denote aS =
∏
j∈S aj .1423
Observation D.3. The probability of subset S is qS = `aS.1424
Proof. For every item j, the probability it is excluded is1425
1− qj = 1−
1
aj + 1
=
aj
aj + 1
= qjaj .1426
So the probability of the outcome being precisely S is1427
qS =
∏
j∈S
qj
∏
j /∈S
(1− qj)
1428
=
∏
j∈S
qj
∏
j /∈S
qjaj
1429
=
 m∏
j=1
qj
∏
j /∈S
aj
 = `aS ,1430
1431
as claimed.1432
Observation D.3 immediately implies:1433
Observation D.4. For every subset S, aS + aS = aS +
A2
aS
≥ 2A, where equality1434
holds iff aS = aS = A. Equivalently, qS + qS ≥ 2`A, where equality holds iff qS =1435
qS = `A.1436
Proof. The inequality in the observation holds by the inequality of arithmetic and1437
geometric means (AM-GM inequality), which states that for any two non-negative1438
numbers w, z, (w + z)/2 ≥
√
wz. Namely, for z = aS , w = A
2/aS , and A =
√
zw the1439
AM-GM inequality states that aS + A
2/aS = z + w ≥ 2
√
wz = 2
√
aS ·A2/aS = 2A1440
as claimed.1441
Observation D.4 shows the connection between MIN-MAX-PROB and the NP-1442
hard problem MIN-MAX PRODUCT PARTITION: q is a YES instance (there exists1443
a subset of items S such that qS = `A) iff aS = A.1444
The following observation will be useful in the reduction to δ-OPT-CONTRACT.1445
Observation D.5. Let ∆ = 1− `A2m−1, then 0 < ∆ < 1.1446
Proof. By definition,
`A =
√∏
aj∏
(aj + 1)
≤
∏√
aj + 1∏
(aj + 1)
=
1∏√
aj + 1
≤ 1
2m
<
1
2m−1
,
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where the second-to-last inequality follows since aj ≥ 3 and so
√
aj + 1 ≥ 2. We1447
conclude that `A2m−1 < 1, completing the proof.1448
D.2. Proof of Proposition D.1. We now use hardness of MIN-MAX-PROB1449
to establish hardness of δ-OPT-CONTRACT.1450
Proof of Proposition D.1. The proof is by reduction from MIN-MAX-PROB, as1451
follows.1452
Reduction. Given an instance q of MIN-MAX-PROB, construct a principal-1453
agent setting with n = 3 actions.1454
• For action a1, set its product distribution q1 to be q.1455
• For action a2, set its product distribution q2 to be 1 − q (i.e., q1,j + q2,j = 1 for1456
every item j).1457
• For action a3, set its product distribution q3 to be such that q3,1 = 1 (i.e., this1458
action’s outcome always includes item 1), and q3,j =
1
2 for every other item j > 1.1459
Set costs c1, c2 to zero and set c3 to be c = (amax + 1)
−1. The only nonzero reward is1460
r = r1 for item 1; set r to be any number strictly greater than ∆
−1.1461
Analysis. First notice that the reduction is polynomial in m; in particular, the1462
number of bits of precision required to describe the probabilities, cost c and reward r1463
is polynomial.1464
The analysis will show that the expected payoff the principal can extract by a1465
δ-IC contract if q is a YES instance is strictly larger than if q is a NO instance. We1466
introduce some notation: Let S1 = {S ⊆ [m] | 1 ∈ S}, i.e., S1 is the collection of1467
all item subsets containing item 1. Given a contract p, let P =
∑
S∈S1 pS (the total1468
payment for subsets in S1). Observe that the expected payment to the agent if he1469
chooses action a3 is
P
2m−1 .1470
Claim D.6. Action a3 can be weakly δ-incentivized with expected payment
c
∆(1+δ)1471
if and only if q is a YES instance of MIN-MAX-PROB.1472
Proof of Claim D.6. Fix a δ-IC contract p that weakly δ-incentivizes action a3.1473
By Observation D.3, the agent’s expected utility from action a1 is `
∑
S pSaS and from1474
action a2 is `
∑
S pSaS . The agent’s expected utility from action a3 (after boosting1475
by (1 + δ)) is P (1+δ)2m−1 − c.1476
Assume first that q is a NO instance. If p weakly incentivizes action a3 then1477
P (1 + δ)
2m−1
− c ≥ ` ·max
{∑
S
pSaS ,
∑
S
pSaS
}
1478
≥ `
2
(∑
S
pSaS +
∑
S
pSaS
)
1479
=
`
2
∑
S
pS(aS + aS) > `A
∑
S
pS ≥ `AP,1480
where the second-to-last inequality is by Observation D.4, and is strict by our as-1481
sumption that q is a NO instance. Rearranging P (1+δ)2m−1 − c > `AP we get1482
c <
P (1 + δ)
2m−1
− `AP (1 + δ) = P (1 + δ)
2m−1
(
1− `A2m−1
)
=
P∆(1 + δ)
2m−1
.1483
By Observation D.5 we can divide both sides by ∆(1 + δ) > 0 to establish P2m−1 >1484
c
∆(1+δ) , completing the proof of the first direction.1485
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Assume now that q is a YES instance. Then there exists S∗ such that aS∗ =1486
aS∗ = A, and without loss of generality S
∗ ∈ S1 (otherwise take its complement).1487
Consider the following contract: Let pS∗ =
c2m−1
∆(1+δ) and set all other payments to 0.1488
The expected payment to the agent for action a3 is
pS∗
2m−1 =
c
∆(1+δ) as required, and1489
the agent’s expected utility (after boosting by (1 + δ)) is pS∗ (1+δ)2m−1 − c =
c
∆ − c =1490
c(1−∆)
∆ . Plugging in ∆ = 1 − `A2
m−1, we get that the expected utility from action1491
a3 is `A
c2m−1
∆ = `ApS∗ . This is equal to the expected utility from action a1, since1492
`
∑
S pSaS = `pS∗aS∗ = `ApS∗ Similarly, the expected utility from action a2 is also1493
`ApS∗ . We conclude that p weakly δ-incentivizes a3, completing the proof of Claim1494
D.6.1495
We now use Claim D.6 to complete the hardness proof by showing that the ex-1496
pected payoff the principal can extract if q is a YES instance is strictly larger than if1497
q is a NO instance.1498
For a YES instance, by Claim D.6 action a3 can be weakly δ-incentivized with1499
expected payment c∆(1+δ) . We argue that the values chosen in the reduction for c and r1500
guarantee that action a3 has the (strictly) highest expected payoff for the principal, so1501
the agent breaks ties in favor of a3: Since the only positive reward is r1 = r and since1502
q3,1 = 1, the expected payoff from a3 is q3,1r1 − c∆(1+δ) = r −
c
∆(1+δ) . The expected1503
reward (and thus also payoff) from a1 is at most q1,1r1 ≤ r4 (using that a1+1 ≥ 4), and1504
the expected reward from a2 is at most q2,1r1 ≤ (1− 1amax+1 )r. Since
r
4 ≤ (1−
1
amax+1
)r1505
(using that amax ≥ 3), it suffices to show r − c∆(1+δ) ≥ r −
c
∆ > (1 −
1
amax+1
)r, or1506
simplifying, r > c(amax+1)∆ . Since the reduction sets c = (amax + 1)
−1 and r > ∆−1,1507
the argument is complete.1508
For a NO instance, by Claim D.6 the expected payoff from a3 is strictly lower than1509
r− c∆(1+δ) . By the analysis of the YES case we know that the expected rewards from1510
a1, a2 are strictly lower than r − c∆ (and by limited liability the principal’s expected1511
payoff is bounded by the expected reward). This completes the proof of Proposition1512
D.1.1513
Appendix E. An FPTAS for the separation oracle. In this appendix we1514
establish the FPTAS for MIN-LR stated in Lemma 3.3. Recall from the discussion1515
leading to Lemma 3.3 that the separation oracle problem reduces to MIN-LR.1516
Proof of Lemma 3.3. We adapt an FPTAS of Moran [41] (see also subsequent
papers such as [43]). Let
∆ = (1 + ε)1/2m.
FPTAS algorithm. The algorithm proceeds in iterations from 0 to m. In1517
iteration j, the partial solutions in that iteration are subsets of the first j items. For1518
a partial solution S ⊆ {1, . . . , j}, recall that q`,S is the marginal probability to draw1519
S among the first k items if the sample is distributed according to q`.1520
The partial solutions in iteration j are partitioned into families Yj,1, . . . , Yj,rj .1521
The partition is such that for every family r ∈ [rj ] and partial solutions S, S′ ∈ Yj,r,1522
for every distribution ` ∈ [k] ∪ {i}, the ratio between q`,S and q`,S′ is at most ∆.1523
In the first iteration j = 0, the only solution is the empty set. The solutions in1524
iteration j+ 1 are generated from the families in iteration j as follows: One arbitrary1525
partial solution S is chosen from every family Yj,r to “represent” it, and for each such1526
S two partial solutions S ∪{j+ 1} and S are added to the solutions of iteration j+ 11527
(i.e., with and without the (j + 1)st item).1528
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The algorithm outputs the minimum objective 1qi,S
∑
k αkqk,S among the solutions1529
S in iteration m.1530
Analysis. We first argue that ALG ≤ (1 + ε)OPT . Let S∗ be the optimal1531
solution, and denote the subset of S∗ containing only items among the first j by S∗j .1532
By induction, in iteration j there is a partial solution S′j such that ∆
−j · q`,S∗j ≤1533
q`,S′j ≤ ∆
j · q`,S∗j for every distribution ` ∈ [k] ∪ {i}. Denote S
′ = S′m. Then1534
ALG ≤ 1qi,S′
∑
k αkqk,S′ ≤ ∆2m ·
1
qi,S∗
∑
k αkqk,S∗ = (1 + ε)OPT .1535
It remains to show that the FPTAS runs in polynomial time. The running time
is O(
∑
j rj). In the input distributions {qk}, qi, denote the range of every nonzero
probability by [qmin, 1] (qmin can be exponentially small). For every distribution ` ∈
[k] ∪ {i}, the probabilities that are not 0 are at least qmmin. So a partition “in jumps
of ∆” requires O(t) parts, where t is the smallest integer satisfying qmmin ·∆t ≥ 1. So
t =
⌈
m log(q−1min)
log ∆
⌉
=
⌈
2m2 log(q−1min)
log (1 + ε)
⌉
≤
⌈
2m2 log(q−1min)
ε
⌉
,
where the last inequality uses log(1 + ε) ≥ ε for ε ∈ (0, 1]. Since the partition to1536
rj families maintains “jumps of ∆” for n distributions, rk = O(t
n). We invoke the1537
assumption that n is constant to complete the analysis and the proof of Lemma 3.3.1538
Appendix F. Hardness of MIN-PAYMENT. In this appendix we show the1539
following counterpart to Corollary 4.2.1540
Proposition F.1. For any constant c ∈ R, c ≥ 1, it is NP-hard to approximate1541
the minimum expected payment for implementing a given action to within a multi-1542
plicative factor c.1543
Proof. The proof is by reduction from MAX-3SAT. Given an instance of MAX-1544
3SAT, the goal is to determine whether the instance is satisfiable or whether at most1545
7
8 + ε of the clauses can be satisfied, where ε is an arbitrarily small constant.1546
Reduction. Given ϕ, we obtain the SAT principal-agent setting corresponding1547
to ϕ (Proposition 4.12), but we set the reward for every item to be 1 rather than 0.1548
We add an action an+1 with cost C and product distribution qn+1 with probability 121549
for every item.1550
Analysis. As in the analysis in the proof of Proposition 4.15, if ϕ has a satisfying1551
assignment then we can implement an+1 at cost C. Otherwise recall that by Definition1552
4.11, the average action over the first n actions leads to every item set S with proba-1553
bility at least 1−8ε2m . Consider a contract p and let P =
∑
S pS . The expected utility1554
of the agent for choosing an+1 is P/2m−C. Consider again the average action over the1555
first n actions. The expected payment to the agent for “choosing” this action (i.e.,1556
the expected payment over the average distribution) is at least 1−8ε2m P =
P
2m −
8εP
2m ,1557
and there is some action ai (with cost 0) for which the expected payment is as high.1558
To incentivize an+1 over ai it must hold that
P
2m − C ≥
P
2m −
8εP
2m , i.e.,
P
2m ≥
C
8ε .1559
We conclude that if there is no assignment satisfying more than 78 + ε of the clauses,1560
the expected payment for implementing an+1 is
C
8ε rather than C. Approximating the1561
expected payment within a multiplicative factor 18ε would thus solve the MAX-3SAT1562
instance we started with, and we can make ε as small a constant as we want.1563
Appendix G. Proofs omitted from Section 4. In this appendix we provide1564
proofs for Propositions 4.8 and 4.9. In particular, we establish the existence of gap1565
settings for 2 actions (Proposition 4.8) and c actions (Proposition 4.9).1566
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Proof of Proposition 4.8. For the gap setting constructed above with c = 2 ac-1567
tions and γ = ε, consider a δ-IC contract. Since the expected reward of the first1568
action a1 is 1, and the maximum expected welfare is 2 − γ ≥ 2 − 4ε1+2ε , if a contract1569
is to extract more than 12−4ε/(1+2ε) =
1
2 + ε of the expected welfare then it must1570
δ-incentivize the last action ac (a limited liability contract cannot extract more than1571
the expected reward from an agent choosing a1, since a1 is zero-cost). Let p be the1572
payment for the item and let p0 be the payment for the empty set. For any action ai∗1573
that the contract δ-incentivizes, the following inequality must hold for every i ∈ [c]:1574
(1 + δ)
(
γc−i
∗
p+ (1− γc−i
∗
)p0
)
− 1
γi∗−1
+ i∗ − (i∗ − 1)γ ≥1575 (
γc−ip+ (1− γc−i)p0
)
− 1
γi−1
+ i− (i− 1)γ.(G.1)1576
Observe that for the contract to δ-incentivize ac at minimum expected payment, it
must hold that p0 = 0. We can now plug p0 = 0 into inequality (G.1) and choose
i∗ = c, i = i∗ − 1. We get a lower bound on the expected payment for δ-incentivizing
ac:
p ≥ (1− γ)
2
γ(1 + δ − γ)
.
The principal’s expected payoff is thus ≤ 1γ −
(1−γ)2
γ(1+δ−γ) ≤
1
1+γ2−γ , where the last1577
inequality uses δ ≤ f(ε) = γ2. We get an upper bound of 11+γ2−γ on what the best1578
δ-IC contract can extract out of 2 − γ for the principal. The ratio is thus at most1579
1
2 + ε (using γ ≤
1
4 ), and this completes the proof of Proposition 4.8.1580
Proof of Proposition 4.9. For the gap setting constructed above with c actions1581
and γ = ε, consider a δ-IC contract. As in the proof of Proposition 4.8, this contract1582
cannot extract more than 1c + ε of the expected welfare by δ-incentivizing action a1.1583
Assume from now on that the contract δ-incentivizes action ai∗ for i
∗ ≥ 2 at minimum1584
expected payment. As in the proof of Proposition 4.8, Inequality (G.1) must hold for1585
i∗ and every i ∈ [c].1586
Assume first that the contract’s payment p0 for the empty set is zero. (This1587
assumption is without loss of generality for the case of c = 2 actions, as well as for1588
c ≥ 3 and fully-IC optimal contracts by Proposition 6 in [23].) Plugging p0 = 01589
into Inequality (G.1) and choosing i = i∗ − 1, we get a lower bound on the expected1590
payment for δ-incentivizing ai∗ (in particular making it preferable to ai∗−1):1591
(G.2) γc−i
∗
p ≥ (1− γ
i∗−1)(1− γ)
γi∗−1(1 + δ − γ)
.1592
The principal’s expected payoff is thus ≤ 1
γi∗−1
− (1−γ
i∗−1)(1−γ)
γi∗−1(1+δ−γ) ≤
γc+γi
∗−1(1−γ)
γi∗−1(1+γc−γ) =1593
γc
γi∗−1(1+γc−γ) +
1−γ
1+γc−γ , where the last inequality uses δ ≤ f(ε) = γ
c. Maximizing1594
this expression by plugging in i∗ = c, we get an upper bound of 11+γc−γ on what the1595
best δ-IC contract can extract out of c− (c−1)γ for the principal. The ratio can thus1596
be shown to be at most 1c + ε, as required (using that c ≥ 3 and γ ≤
1
4 ; see Claim1597
G.1).1598
Now consider the case that p0 > 0. We argue that in this case, plugging i = i
∗−11599
into Inequality (G.1) gives a lower-bound on γc−i
∗
p that is only higher than that in1600
Inequality (G.2). To see this, consider the contribution of p0 > 0 to the left-hand side1601
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of Inequality (G.1), which is (1 + δ)(1 − γc−i∗)p0. Compare this to its contribution1602
to the right-hand side of Inequality (G.1), which is (1 − γc−i)p0. For δ ≤ γc, γ ≤ 141603
and i = i∗ − 1 it holds that (1 + δ)(1 − γc−i∗) ≤ 1 − γc−i. This completes the proof1604
of Proposition 4.9 up to Claim G.1.1605
Claim G.1. For every γ ∈ (0, 14 ] and c ∈ Z, c ≥ 3,
1
1 + γc − γ
· 1
c− (c− 1)γ
≤ 1
c
+ γ.
Proof. We first establish the claim for c = 3. We need to show 11+γ3−γ ·
1
3−2γ ≤1606
1
3 + γ. Simplifying, we need to show 13γ+ 6γ
4 ≤ 4 + 9γ2 + 7γ3, which holds for every1607
γ ≤ 14 .1608
We now consider c ≥ 4: It is sufficient to show 11−γ ·
1
c−cγ ≤
1
c + γ. Multiplying1609
by c we get 1(1−γ)2 ≤ 1 + cγ. This holds if and only if c ≥
2−γ
(1−γ)2 . The right-hand side1610
is an increasing function in the range 0 < γ ≤ 14 and so we can plug in γ =
1
4 and1611
verify. Since c ≥ 4 ≥ 289 , the proof is complete.1612
Appendix H. Approximation by separable contracts. In this appendix1613
we examine the gap between separable and optimal contracts.1614
Recall that a contract p is separable if there are payments p1, ..., pm such that1615
p(S) =
∑
j∈S pj for every S ⊆M . By linearity of expectation, the expected payment1616
for action ai given a separable contract p is
∑
j qi,jpj .1617
As we have shown in Proposition A.1 the optimal separable contract can be com-1618
puted in polynomial time via linear programming. Thus we know that separable (and1619
other simple computationally-tractable) contracts cannot achieve a constant approx-1620
imation to OPT unless P = NP (Corollary 4.2).1621
In fact, an even stronger lower bound holds—they cannot achieve an approxima-1622
tion better than n, unless we relax the IC requirement to δ-IC. We provide a proof of1623
this general lower bound for the case of n = 2.1624
Proposition H.1. For every ε > 0 there is a principal-agent instance with n = 21625
actions and m = 2 items, in which the best separable contract only provides a 2 − ε1626
approximation to OPT .1627
Proof. For δ ∈ (0, 1) consider the following n = 2 actions and m = 2 items1628
instance. The probabilities qi,j for the two actions i ∈ {1, 2} and items j ∈ {1, 2} are1629
q1,1 =
δ
2
, q1,2 = 1−
δ
2
and q2,1 =
1
2
, q2,2 =
1
2
.1630
1631
The rewards rj for the two items j ∈ {1, 2} are1632
r1 =
1− (1− δ2 )δ
δ
2
and r2 = δ.1633
1634
The resulting expected rewards Ri for the two actions i ∈ {1, 2} are1635
R1 = q1,1r1 + q1,2r2 =
δ
2
1− (1− δ2 )δ
δ
2
+ (1− δ
2
)δ = 1, and1636
R2 = q2,1r1 + q2,2r2 =
1
2
1− (1− δ2 )δ
δ
2
+
1
2
δ =
1
δ
− 1 + δ,1637
1638
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so that R2 > 1 for all δ ∈ (0, 1) and R2 → ∞ as δ → 0. The costs ci for the two1639
actions i ∈ {1, 2} are1640
c1 = 0 and c2 = (1− δ)(R2 −R1) = (1− δ)(
1
δ
− 2 + δ).1641
1642
Note that on this instance1643
R1 − c1 = 1 and R2 − c2 = 2− 2δ + δ2.16441645
We claim that: (1) The optimal contract can incentivize action 2 with an expected1646
payment of c2/(1 − δ2), so that the expected payoff to the principal is R2 − c2/(1 −1647
δ2) = (1/δ − 1 + δ) − (1/δ − 2 + δ)/(1 + δ). (2) The optimal separable contract can1648
either incentivize action 1 by paying nothing or it can incentivize action 2 by setting1649
p1 = 2c2/(1− δ) and p2 = 0. Since1650
R2 − q2,1p1 = (
1
δ
− 1 + δ)− 1
2
2c2
(1− δ)
= 11651
1652
the expected payoff to the principal in both cases is 1.1653
Using (1) and (2) and setting δ = 12 (3− ε−
√
ε2 − 10ε+ 9) we have1654
OPT
ALG
= (
1
δ
− 1 + δ)−
1
δ − 2 + δ
1 + δ
= 2− ε.1655
1656
It remains to show (1) and (2). For (1) denote the payments in the optimal1657
contract for outcomes (1,0), (0,1), and (1,1) by p1, p2, p1,2. The optimal contract can1658
incentivize action 2 via p1 > 0 and p2 = p1,2 = 0 as long as1659
q2,1(1− q2,2)p1 − c2 ≥ q1,1(1− q1,2)p11660
⇔ p1 ≥
c2
q2,1(1− q2,2)− q1,1(1− q1,2)
=
4c2
1− δ2
1661
1662
Setting p1 = 4c2/(1−δ2) leads to an expected payment of q2,1(1−q2,2)p1 = c2/(1−δ2).1663
For (2) denote the payments of the optimal separable contract by p1 and p2 and1664
note that the optimal separable contract either has p1 > 0 and p2 = 0 or it has p1 = 01665
and p2 > 0. In the former case the incentive constraint is1666
q2,1p1 − c2 ≥ q1,1p116671668
and in the latter it is1669
q2,2p2 − c2 ≥ q1,2p2.16701671
Note that since q1,2 = 1 − δ/2 > 1/2 = q1,2 it is impossible to incentivize action1672
2 by having only p2 > 0. In the other case, where only p1 > 0, the smallest p1 that1673
satisfies the incentive constraint is p1 = c2/(q2,1 − q1,1) = 2c2/(1− δ).1674
Appendix I. Proofs of technical lemmas in Section 6. In this appendix1675
we provide proofs for Lemma 6.3, Lemma 6.4, Lemma 6.5, and Lemma 6.7.1676
Proof of Lemma 6.3. Note that with s = (3 log( 2nηγ ))/(ηε
2) we have γ = nη ·1677
2 exp(−ηsε2/3). Further note that since qi,S ≥ η for all i ∈ [n] and S ⊆M each action1678
can assign positive probability to at most 1/η sets S. Finally, for all i ∈ [n], S ⊆ M1679
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such that qi,S = 0 we have q̃i,S = 0. So, by the union bound, it suffices to show that1680
for each of the at most n/η pairs i, S with qi,S > 0 the probability with which q̃i,S1681
does not fall into [(1− ε)qi,S , (1 + ε)qi,S ] is at most 2 exp(−ηsε2/3).1682
Consider any such pair i, S. Let Xi,S denote the random variable that counts the1683
number of times set S was returned in the s queries to action i. Then q̃i,S = Xi,S/s1684
and E[X] = sqi,S . So, using Chernoff’s bound,1685
Pr[q̃i,S 6∈ [(1− ε)qi,S , (1 + ε)qi,S ]] = Pr[|Xi,S − E[Xi,S ]| ≥ ε]1686
≤ 2 exp(−ηsε2/3),16871688
as claimed.1689
Proof of Lemma 6.4. Let ai be the action that is incentivized by p under the1690
actual probabilities Q, and let ai′ be any other action. Then,1691 ∑
S⊆M
q̃i,Spi,S − ci + 2ε ≥ (1− ε)
∑
S⊆M
qi,Spi,S − ci + 2ε1692
≥
∑
S⊆M
qi,Spi,S − ci + ε1693
≥
∑
S⊆M
qi′,Spi′,S − ci′ + ε1694
≥ (1 + ε)
∑
S⊆M
qi′,Spi′,S − ci′1695
≥
∑
S⊆M
q̃i′,Spi′,S − ci′ ,1696
1697
where we used the bounds on the probabilities in the first and last step, that we are1698
considering normalized settings in the second and fourth step, and the IC constraint1699
in the third step.1700
Proof of Lemma 6.5. Let ai be the action that is incentivized by p̃ under the1701
empirical probabilities Q̃, and let ai′ be any other action. Then,1702 ∑
S⊆M
qi,Spi,S − ci + δ + 2ε ≥ (1 + ε)
∑
S⊆M
qi,Spi,S − ci + δ + ε1703
≥
∑
S⊆M
q̃i,Spi,S − ci + δ + ε1704
≥
∑
S⊆M
q̃i′,Spi′,S − ci′ + ε1705
≥ (1− ε)
∑
S⊆M
qi′,Spi′,S − ci′ + ε1706
≥
∑
S⊆M
qi′,Spi′,S − ci′ ,1707
1708
where we used that we are considering normalized settings in the first and the last1709
step, the bounds on the probabilities in the second and fourth step, and the δ-IC1710
constraint in the third step.1711
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Proof of Lemma 6.6. We have,1712
Π̃ =
∑
S⊆M
q̃i,SrS −
∑
S⊆M
q̃i,Spi,S1713
≤ (1 + ε)
∑
S⊆M
qi,SrS − (1− ε)
∑
S⊆M
qi,Spi,S1714
≤
∑
S⊆M
qi,SrS −
∑
S⊆M
qi,Spi,S + 2ε1715
= Π + 2ε,17161717
where we used the bounds on the payments in the first step and that we are considering1718
normalized settings in the second.1719
Proof of Lemma 6.7. We have,1720
P =
∑
S⊆M
qi,SrS −
∑
S⊆M
qi,Spi,S1721
≤ 1
1− ε
∑
S⊆M
q̃i,SrS −
1
1 + ε
∑
S⊆M
q̃i,Spi,S1722
≤ (1 + 2ε)
∑
S⊆M
q̃i,SrS − (1− ε)
∑
S⊆M
qi,Spi,S1723
= Π + 3ε,17241725
where we used the bounds on the probability in the first step, and that 1/(1−ε) ≤ 1+2ε1726
and 1/(1 + ε) ≥ 1− ε for all ε ≤ 1/2.1727
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